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The prevalence of the Chevron doctrine in administrative law has
prompted widespread scholarly controversy concerning how the doctrine
operates in practice. Three descriptive models have emerged. Some
commentators have embraced a contextual model and contend that Chevron is
a "revolution on paper" that has failed to replace the traditional contextual
approach to judicial review of agency action. Others rely on a political model
and maintain that the Chevron doctrine is so indeterminate that it serves
primarily as cover for judges who decide cases based on their personal
political preferences. Other commentators rely on an interpretive model and
insist that Chevron is unstable because textualist judges apply the doctrine
differentlyfrom judges who reject a textualist approach.
This Article presents the results of an empirical study designed to
evaluate how accurately the three models describe the Chevron doctrine. By
examining the published decisions of the US. Courts of Appeals in 1995 and
1996, the author concludes that the three descriptive models largely fail to
predict outcomes in actual controversies. The political model mounts the most
effective attack, as the study reveals a significant difference in voting patterns
between Republican and Democratic judges in ideologically charged cases.
However, the results suggest that the contextual model's ability to predict
Chevron results is weak at best, and that the interpretive model's predictions
are unsupported The author concludes by offering possible explanations for
the divergence between the models' predictions and the reality suggested by
the study's results.
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Introduction
In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the
United States Supreme Court announced a two-step test for judicial review of
agency interpretations of statutes. First, the court must ask if the statute is
ambiguous: if the statute is clear, the court should give effect to the expressed
intent of Congress. Second, if the statute is unclear, the court must accept the
agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable.2 This test, often called the
"Chevron two-step," has been an enormously popular subject of realist
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Chevron itself expressed the test as follows:
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
Thus, if the statute is unambiguous, the Chevron analysis is said to be resolved at step one: the
court must follow the expressed intent of Congress. If the statute is ambiguous, then the analysis is
resolved at step two: the court accepts the agency interpretation as long as it is permissible (i.e.,
reasonable). See I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICiIARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
3.2-3.4 (3d ed. 1994).
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critique.3 Skeptical that judicial review of agency legal interpretation could
operate as simply as the two-step test suggests, commentators have authored a
substantial body of work explaining what really happens when judges apply
the Chevron doctrine.4
The scholarly critique of Chevron offers three distinct models of how
courts review agency interpretations of statutory law. The first is a contextual
model, which acknowledges that the two-step test exists on paper, but posits
that in practice judges continue to adhere to the multi-factored, contextual
approach to judicial review that judges are understood to have followed before
the Chevron case was decided. According to the proponents of the contextual
model, the pre-Chevron "traditional factors" continue to influence judicial
decisions to accept or reject agency interpretations despite the contrary logic
of the two-step test.5 The second popular critique of the doctrine is a political
model, which views Chevron through the result-oriented lens of politics.
Followers of the political model consider the two-step test to be a justificatory
ritual that legitimates results reached to further judges' political agendas.
Accordingly, outcomes are best explained in terms of the political ideologies
of individual judges.6 The third critique of Chevron is an interpretive model.
3. See generally PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 620-36
(9th ed. 1995) (discussing the importance of Chevron in the courts, as well as the scholarly reaction to
it). The critique of Chevron is realist in the sense that it embodies the rule-skepticism often associated
with legal realism. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND at vii (Coward-McCann
1949) (1930) ("As these skeptics see it, the trouble is that the formal legal rules enunciated in courts'
opinions-sometimes called the 'paper rules'-too often prove unreliable as guides to the prediction of
decisions. They believe that they can discover, behind the 'paper rules,' some 'real rules' descriptive of
uniformities or regularities in actual judicial behavior, and that those 'real rules' will serve as more
reliable prediction-instruments. ... ); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 140-41 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing a brand of rule-skepticism in which doctrine is viewed as a form of "window dressing" used
to explain a judicial result reached intuitively).
4. See infra notes 5-7.
5. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
372-77 (1986); Clark Byse, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Interpretations of Statutes: An Analysis of
Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 266 (1988); Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer
to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 1275, 1295-98; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-90 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat
Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986); Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About
Chevron, 58 Mo. L. REV. 129, 129-32, 138-66 (1993); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in
Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 580 (1992). See discussion of traditional factors infra
Section l.A.
6. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65, 68-83 (1994); Christopher F. Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political
Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 587-88; William S. Jordan, 111, Deference Revisited: Politics as a
Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV.
454, 486-90 (1989); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions,
1995 DUKE L.J. I 110, 1123 [hereinafter Pierce, Legislative Reform]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative Stale,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779-80 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Hypertextualism]; Sidney A. Shapiro &
Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative
Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1068-72 (1995); Katherine L. Vaughns, A Tale of Two Opinions: The
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The interpretive model predicts that deference in individual cases depends
upon a judge's approach to statutory interpretation-in particular, the
likelihood that text will be considered ambiguous at Chevron's step one.7 In
contrast to the contextual and political models, the interpretive model accepts
that judges will attempt to apply the two-step test objectively. Nonetheless, the
doctrine is considered inherently unstable because individual judges will defer
more or less often depending upon how readily they perceive ambiguity in
statutory text.
Despite the debate among proponents of the three models, the evidence to
support their often-conflicting claims typically is anecdotal at best. As a result,
the scholarship on Chevron has reached an impasse, in which three distinct
paradigms of the doctrine compete for attention without the substantial
empirical evidence needed to advance or impede their claims.'
This Article presents the results of an empirical study designed to evaluate
the claims of the three competing models of Chevron. By examining every
application of the Chevron doctrine published by the United States Courts of
Appeals during 1995 and 1996, the Article hopes to explain how various
factors affect the likelihood that a judge will vote to uphold or reject executive
interpretations under the doctrine. In other words, what really happens when a
judge applies the Chevron doctrine? What factors actually influence a judge's
decision to accept or reject an agency's interpretation of statutory law?
In particular, the study evaluates the empirical claims of each of the three
models of Chevron by examining more than 250 applications of the doctrine,
culled from over 200 published cases. The contextual model is tested by
comparing judicial acceptance rates of agency interpretations when the
Meaning of Statutes and the Nature of Judicial Decision-Making in the Administrative Context, 1995
B.Y.U. L. REV. 139, 149-50.
7. See Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process: Can
It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 132-33 (1997); Gregory G. Garre, CERCLA,
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, and the D.C. Circuit's Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations Under Chevron, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 951-53 (1990); Michael Herz, Textualism
and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1668-72 (1991);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory
Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 401, 459-64 (1994); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist
Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is
Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1248-50 (1996); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827,
832-35 (1991); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 362 (1994); Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at 752; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520-21; Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the
Piano Player"?: Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430 n.91 (1989); Arthur
Stock, Note, Justice Scalia 's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 160. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 876-78
(2d ed. 1995) (summarizing arguments); Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron
Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 393-95 (1996) (same).
8. The existing body of empirical work on the Chevron doctrine is discussed at length in Part 1.
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traditional factors are present with acceptance rates when they are absent.9 To
evaluate the political model, the study compares the voting patterns of
conservative and liberal judges in ideologically polarized areas such as
immigration and the environment. Finally, the interpretive model is assessed
by considering how voting patterns, likelihood of finding ambiguity, and
inclination to apply the two-step test vary among judges of different
interpretive schools. From these data, I hope to develop a working model of
the doctrine that describes "what the courts . . . do in fact"' when judges
apply the two-step formula."
The Article contains four parts. Part I explains and develops the three
models of Chevron that are popular in the literature, paying special attention
to the empirical claims made by each. Part II develops the methodology used
to evaluate the claims of each model. The results of the study, along with
statistical analyses, are presented in Part III. Finally, Part IV presents an
analysis of the results, focusing on how well or poorly each of the three
critiques of the doctrine predicts actual judicial behavior, and why. Part IV
also offers possible explanations for the divergence between the models'
predictions and the reality suggested by the study's results.
I. Three Models of the Chevron Doctrine
The large body of literature on the Chevron doctrine draws primarily from
three distinct models of how the doctrine functions in practice. Each model
presents a jurisprudential paradigm in which a particular set of factors is
believed to alter the chances that reviewing courts will uphold agency
interpretations of statutory law. Because more than one set of factors can
affect the outcomes of Chevron cases, these models are not mutually
exclusive: Several might be needed to explain patterns of judicial outcomes
9. The term "acceptance rate" is used throughout to represent the percentage rate at which the
court accepts the agency's interpretation. For example, a court that accepts two interpretations and
rejects one has an acceptance rate of 67%.
10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) ("What the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, [is] what I mean by the law .... "). I have been
particularly inspired by BENJAMIN N. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-19 (1921).
11. Such a working model should be helpful to a broad cross-section of the legal community:
scholars will be able to refocus their efforts with a greater knowledge of what it is they are trying to
critique; students of administrative law will better understand what the much-discussed Chevron
doctrine actually does; and administrative law practitioners will be able to predict more accurately which
factors help influence the outcomes of their agency-deference cases.
This study also has broad implications for those interested in jurisprudence, particularly
hermeneutics and interpretation. Although the three models question the integrity and stability of the
Chevron doctrine in particular, they implicitly question the integrity and stability of all legal doctrines
generally. Each model is the product of a distinct jurisprudential paradigm, which claims its own
insights into how legal doctrines function (or malfunction) within judicial decisions. Evaluating how the
three models succeed or fail in describing one doctrine provides a case study of how these paradigms
succeed in describing the role of doctrine throughout law.
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accurately. 2 However, despite their ability to function simultaneously, the
three paradigms are conceptually very different. This part discusses the three
models in detail, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that inform them and
the empirical claims that these assumptions produce.
A. The Contextual Model
Scholars generally agree that, before Chevron was decided in 1984,
judicial review of agency interpretations was governed by a multi-factored,
contextual mode of analysis. 3 Whether a reviewing court chose to defer to an
agency's statutory interpretations depended on a number of "traditional
factors" that the case law suggested should be considered. These factors
included: whether the agency's construction was rendered contemporaneously
with the statute's passage; whether the agency's construction was of
longstanding application; whether the agency maintained its position
consistently; whether the agency's interpretation was based on expertise, or
involved a technical and complex subject; whether the agency's construction
would expand the agency's jurisdiction; and whether Congress was aware of
the agency view and expressly declined to take action to repudiate it.
14
Directed to consider these factors but bound by none, courts applied flexible,
functional standards of deference. At its best, this approach preserved judicial
power to declare what the law is, but also respected agency judgments where
the agency was institutionally better suited to decide the matter, either because
the agency had developed specialized expertise, or because the circumstances
of the agency's construction suggested an understanding of Congress's true
intent that a court might not be able to discern. 5
The central claim of the contextual model is that the traditional factors
continue to influence judicial review of agency action in the Chevron era.16 To
those who believe in the contextual model, Chevron is a "revolution on
paper"'7 that has failed to change traditional approaches to judicial review of
agency interpretations of statutory law.'8 As then-Judge Stephen Breyer
12. In fact, it is common for commentators on the Chevron doctrine to rely on more than one
model. Compare Merrill, supra note 5 (relying on the contextual model), with Merrill, supra note 7
(relying on the interpretative model). Cf CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 10 ("Into that strange compound
which is brewed daily in the caldron of the courts, all these ingredients enter in varying proportions.").
13. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 1278-79; Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562-64 (1985); Merrill, supra note 5, at 972-75.
14. See Diver, supra note 13, at 562 n.95 (citing cases).
15. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 973-75. It is worth noting that recent descriptions of the
traditional factors regime probably overstate the degree to which the doctrine attained this ideal. For a
sophisticated contemporaneous perspective on the traditional factors regime, see Louis L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 569-89 (1965).
16. See supra note 5 for articles that rely on the contextual model.
17. Merrill, supra note 5, at 971.
18. See, e.g, Weaver, supra note 5, at 137 ("Chevron was fully consistent with traditional
principles ofjudicial review.").
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explained soon after the case was decided, the rigid two-step formula cannot
be followed in every case because "the way in which questions of statutory
interpretation may arise are too many and too complex to rely upon a single
simple rule to provide an answer."' 9 Because the two-step Chevron formula
seemed difficult to square with the traditional role of a judge reviewing
agency action, Breyer predicted that Chevron was unlikely to replace reliance
on traditional factors of review.2
Justice Breyer's initial sense that the traditional factors of judicial review
survive in the Chevron era has since been shared by many. Professor Thomas
W. Merrill of Northwestern argues that the Chevron era rejects the traditional
factors only "on paper," and that "in practice the [contextual] approach has
lived on."'" Merrill goes so far as to state that he "seriously doubt[s] whether it
would ever be possible to decide all deference questions without being drawn
into some type of contextual or multivariate inquiry."2 Former Chief Judge
Abner Mikva of the D.C. Circuit has also expressed skepticism about whether
the two-step formula could truly replace judicial reliance on contextual
traditional factors: "Deference is not an independent judicial technique that
can simply be evenhandedly brought to bear on each case. Rather, it expresses
a result, the court's determination in a particular case to leave the agency's
interpretation alone."23 Similarly, Professor Clark Byse of Harvard suggests
that, in light of the continuing functional importance of the traditional factors,
"the Chevron model may not be as simple to administer as its literal terms
suggest."24 Other scholars agree that the traditional factors have retained their
vitality in the Chevron era.25
The jurisprudential underpinning of the contextual model is the belief that
courts adopt a managerial stance when reviewing administrative action.
According to this Legal Process-inspired vision, agencies are generally trusted
to pursue broad Congressional goals through administrative action and policy.
The role of reviewing courts is to ensure that agency decisions are "consistent
with the purpose properly to be attributed to the statute."26 Because Congress
has created dozens of different agencies and passed thousands of statutes with
19. Breyer, supra note 5, at 377.
20. See id at 373.
21. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1032.
22. Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
23. Mikva, supra note 5, at 8.
24. Byse, supra note 5, at 266.
25. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 1299 (arguing that the traditional factors are still relevant);
Jordan, supra note 6, at 485 (asserting that the traditional factors have retained their vitality); Weaver,
supra note 5, at 137 ("Chevron was fully consistent with traditional principles of judicial review.").
26. Werhan, supra note 5, at 580 (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION O1 LAW 1417 (tent. ed. 1958)). See Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (1975)
(describing the "traditional model of administrative law" in which "[t]he court's function is one of
containment; review is directed toward keeping the agency within the directives which Congress has
issued").
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varying degrees of textual specificity, this vague but critical task can be
accomplished only if the courts exercise substantial discretion to adopt a
proper standard of review in each case.27 Courts must employ a contextual,
fact-specific approach to judicial review if they are to fulfill their proper
constitutional function.28
Contextualists believe that the traditional factors must continue to be
relevant because the two-step formula, if taken seriously, would dramatically
undermine the courts' ability to fulfill their proper constitutional role.29
Although generalization is somewhat difficult, they typically reason as
follows: Because statutes directing administrative action tend to be vague,30
Chevron issues usually will be resolved at the deferential second step.3
Further, agency interpretations will rarely be so contrary to vague statutory
text that they can be labeled unreasonable.32 As a result, an acceptance of
Chevron would portend the end of real judicial review of agency action. If
Chevron were truly to eclipse the traditiona'l factors, the presence of ambiguity
at the first step would force judges to abdicate their duty to hold agencies
legally accountable for their behavior, thereby dramatically shifting power to
the executive branch.33 The flexible, functional traditional factors would no
longer give courts the power to ensure that agency action is aligned with
statutory purpose. Because courts are unlikely to abdicate their proper
function in this manner, the contextualists predict, deference must "operate[ ]
quite differently in practice than it does on paper."3 The traditional factors
27. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 379; Werhan, supra note 5, at 626; cf. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 51 (1938) (noting that the precision of statutory directives to administrative
agencies will vary with each piece of legislation).
28. See Werhan, supra note 5, at 627 (stating that the managerial model "allows reviewing courts
to employ a contextual approach to fix their responsibility of reviewing agency decisionmaking").
29. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (noting that acceptance of Chevron at face
value would signal "fundamental alterations ... in our constitutional conception of the administrative
state"); Merrill, supra note 5, at 994 (claiming that the two-step test threatens "more enduring
commitments about the proper role of the courts in a system of separated powers").
30. See LANDIS, supra note 27, at 51. This is especially true with regard to New Deal era statutes.
See Stewart, supra note 26, at 1677-79.
3 1. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the
Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 824 (1991) ("[V]irtually all questions of interpretation logically
fall into the second [step] of Chevron's two-step approach."); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L.
REv. 83, 96-97 (1994) (maintaining that resolution at the first step is "relatively rare"); Keith Werhan,
Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 457 (arguing that it is an "unusual case" for
a Chevron dispute to be resolved at the first step).
32. See Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 96; Werhan, supra note 31, at 458 (stating that "post-
Chevron courts routinely uphold the reasonableness of agency interpretations" and fail "to approach the
reasonableness inquiry of step two of the Chevron analysis with any discernible vigor").
33. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 31, at 824 (arguing that Chevron shifts so much power to
agencies that it is unconstitutional, and advocating a return to the multi-factored contextual approach);
Farina, supra note 29, at 456-57; Werhan, supra note 31, at 460.
34. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1025.
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must operate surreptitiously, holding agency action to a higher standard than
that which would have resulted if the Chevron test recited by the courts were
honestly applied."
The empirical claim of the contextual model can be broken down into two
distinct arguments, one of which is beyond the scope of this study, the other of
which is not. The claim that is beyond the scope of this Article is that judges
sometimes will ignore the two-step test completely, and instead rely
exclusively upon the traditional factors for guidance. That is, judges will
refuse to apply or even mention Chevron when reviewing an agency
interpretation of law, and instead analyze the agency action under the
traditional-factor test. In an important study published in the Yale Law Journal
in 1992,36 Professor Merrill provided empirical evidence suggesting that this
claim was true at the Supreme Court level in the 1980s.37 It is unclear,
however, whether his conclusion holds true today, and whether it was ever
true at the circuit court level.38
The contextual model's second claim, which is within the scope of this
study, is that the traditional factors continue to influence judicial review even
when judges apply the Chevron doctrine expressly.39 A recent student
comment attempted to evaluate this claim with regard to one factor in
particular: the consistency of an agency's interpretation over time.4" In the
traditional factors era, courts were directed to defer less or not at all to agency
interpretations that had been revised.4 To determine whether courts continue
to follow this directive, the author of the comment selected forty-three post-
35. See id. at 1027.
36. See id.
37. Professor Merrill found that the Court continued to cite to the traditional factors in 37% of its
opinions issued from 1984 to 1990 in cases raising the issue of whether to defer to an executive
interpretation. See id. at 981. Based on the Supreme Court's explicit reliance on the traditional factors
during this time period, Professor Merrill concluded that the contextual model survived in the Chevron
era because the Court was unwilling to apply Chevron's framework in every appropriate case. See id at
982-83.
38. As Professor Merrill's own later work shows, the Supreme Court has cited the traditional
factors less frequently since 1990. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 360-62. It is possible, then, that Professor
Merrill's study captures the Court before it had come to an agreement that Chevron should replace the
traditional factors. Furthermore, the possibility that applications of the two-step test in the circuit courts
differ from those in the Supreme Court raises questions about how accurately Professor Merrill's study
describes the bulk of the Chevron world. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 123 (contrasting the
consistency with which circuit courts treat Chevron questions with the inconsistency of Supreme Court
applications). Cf. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1117-26 (1987) (arguing that the circuit courts are the primary source of resolution of disputes
concerning judicial review in the Chevron era). In any event, the scope of this study does not include a
reinvestigation into whether the traditional factors continue to exist outside of the world of the two-step
test.
39. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 5, at 137.
40. See David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1997).
41. See id. at 681.
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Chevron circuit court cases in which the agency had altered its interpretation
of the statute.42 Reviewing the cases, the author found that only two of the
opinions appeared to refuse to defer to the agency because of the traditional
directive that revised interpretations are to be afforded little or no deference. 3
The author remarked that the scarcity of opinions resting a refusal to defer on
the traditional factor "strongly suggest[ed]" that courts are no longer
influenced by the directive." However, the limitations of the comment suggest
that the continuing influence of the traditional factors remains an open
question.45 Professor Merrill has noted that a few Supreme Court cases in the
1980s applied Chevron and simultaneously cited the traditional factors, 4' but
no comprehensive study has attempted to determine whether or how the
traditional factors influence outcomes under the Chevron doctrine.47
B. The Political Model
The second model featured in the scholarly commentary on Chevron is
the political model. According to the political model, the best predictor of
deference under the two-step doctrine is the political agenda of the judges
deciding each case.48
Although the role of politics in legal decisionmaking is a common theme
in modem legal scholarship,49 the circumstances under which the two-step test
arose are particularly conducive to a purely political explanation. Throughout
the 1980s, the deregulation-minded Reagan administration openly attempted




45. Several limitations are immediately apparent. First, the study fails to compare deference to
revised interpretations with deference to consistent interpretations. See id. at 701 n.91. Without this
comparison, it is difficult to determine the influence of the agency revision on deference. Second, the
study's methodology rests on the author's ability to identify cases in which the traditional factor actually
altered the outcome, and to distinguish that set from those in which it did not. This is a difficult, if not
impossible, task. Third, the scope of the study is quite narrow: The author considers only 43 cases in
which one traditional factor was present.
46. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 982 n.54.
47. Note that the largest empirical study of the Chevron doctrine, Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984,
is not included here. Although Shuck and Elliot found that the Chevron doctrine increased the overall
rate of affirmance of agency cases in the circuit courts in the months after the case was decided, it did
not address whether the traditional factors continued to affect the chances of affirmance in individual
cases.
48. See supra note 6 for articles that rely on the political model.
49. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997); THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
50. Important cases in administrative law that resulted from these efforts include Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Farmworker
Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987); and, of course, Chevron itself.
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Reagan judiciary's eagerness to adopt an active supervisory stance in agency
cases,5 Chevron's promise of increased deference to executive interpretation
generally served the interests of the Reagan administration.52 Greater
deference equaled greater agency power, and thus increased the Reagan (and
later Bush) administration's power to blunt legislative commands. As a result,
throughout the 1980s, proponents of the Reagan administration's efforts
tended to approve of Chevron, and opponents of Reagan were often harshly
critical of the doctrine.53
Responding to this history, proponents of the political model assert two
related empirical claims at different levels of generality. First, they suggest
that the strength of a judge's inclination to apply and defer under Chevron
depends on how much the judge agrees with the politics of the administration
whose interpretations are being reviewed.54 Because the Chevron standard is
considered particularly deferential to the executive, judges whose ideologies
match that of the executive decisionmaker will be more attracted to Chevron
and more likely to defer than others.55 I will call this the structural claim of the
political model, because it suggests that the structure and stringency of
Chevron review depends upon whether there is a match between the politics
of the executive and judicial branches.
The second empirical claim of the political model is that judges will reach
results in individual cases that further their political ideologies. Liberal judges
will reach liberal outcomes, and conservative judges will reach conservative
outcomes. According to this model, the Chevron doctrine's standards are so
indeterminate that judges applying them are free to adopt an outcome-
orientation:56 the two-step formal shell will support either an acceptance or a
51. See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284
(1986).
52. See Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at 779 ("When the Court decided Chevron, the
Executive Branch was headed by a conservative, Ronald Reagan, and the Judicial Branch included a
majority of liberal and moderate judges who had been appointed by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Carter. In that situation, politically conservative Justices could maximize the likelihood of obtaining
policies that coincided with their ideological preferences by minimizing the power of federal judges and
maximizing the power of agencies. Chevron served that purpose well.").
53. See Jordan, supra note 6, at 483 (finding "a clear correlation between apparent political
ideology and positions favoring or criticizing Chevron").
54. See id at 486, 515. Cf Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 6, at 68-83 (developing a model that
explains why individual justices would want to adopt Chevron to ensure that desired political results
become law). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing
the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 165 (1992) (developing a similar model); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article 1,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992) (same).
55. See Jordan, supra note 6, at 515 ("[Dleference doctrine depends in large part upon the
politics of the various judges and the relationship between their politics and those of the administrations
whose decisions they are reviewing.").
56. See Pierce, Legislative Reform, supra note 6, at 1123 (arguing that Chevron doctrine is
imprecise); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 6, at 1070-71 (arguing that the tools of statutory interpretation
upon which Chevron hinges are "inherently imprecise," freeing judges to reach outcomes that they
prefer without fearing that their opinions will appear to violate "craft norms"); Vaughns, supra note 6, at
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rejection of an agency's position equally well in every case. 7 Thus, for
example, Professor Christopher Edley of Harvard suggests that pro-Reagan
judges applying the doctrine reach outcomes designed to further pro-Reagan
values. 8 Edley hypothesizes that a pro-Reagan judge's decision whether to
choose "deference or intervention would depend upon which posture would,
in the particular circumstances, advance the values of anti-federalism, laissez-
faire efficiency, and so forth."59 Because Chevron is an inherently
indeterminate doctrine, judges can reach outcomes that conform to their
ideological perspectives. I will call this the individual claim of the political
model, because it suggests that outcomes depend upon how the effect of
individual decisions can further or impede the political agendas of the judges
reviewing the administrative action.
Both the structural and individual empirical claims of the political model
rely almost entirely upon anecdotal evidence. 60 Although past studies have
found differences in the voting patterns of judges appointed by Republican
and Democratic presidents over a wide range of substantive areas,6' no
empirical study has tested whether or how much the ideology of judges alters
the outcomes of Chevron analyses. 62 Also, no studies have measured whether
149 (arguing that the Chevron two-step test is "elastic enough to permit a judge to build what she will
out of the language"); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REv. 111, 307
(1995) (arguing that the Chevron test is ambiguous and easy to manipulate).
57. See Vaughns, supra note 6, at 196 (stating that "appellate courts tend to give Chevron either a
strong or weak reading which allows them to, in effect, dictate the outcome of a particular case while
maintaining the appearance of legitimacy").
58. See Edley, supra note 6, at 587-88.
59. Id. at 587.
60. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300,
302 (looking at several cases in the mid 1980s, and concluding that "democratic D.C. Circuit judges are
more likely to reverse agency policies at the behest of individuals, and republican D.C. Circuit judges
are more likely to reverse agency policies challenged by business interests");Vaughns, supra note 6, at
139-40 (concluding that judges use Chevron to satisfy individual agendas, with the evidence being a
majority opinion and a dissent from a single D.C. Circuit case decided in 1986).
61. See, e.g., Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men?: A Study of
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987). Tomasi
and Velona found that in non-unanimous individual benefits cases, Democratic-appointed judges voted
in favor of granting benefits in 69% of cases, those judges appointed by a Republican other than Reagan
did so 34% of the time, and Reagan appointees voted to extend benefits in only 20% of the cases. See id.
at 783. Similarly, in regulatory cases, Democratic-appointed judges adopted a pro-regulatory stance in
56% of the non-unanimous cases, judges appointed by a Republican other than Reagan did so in 48% of
the cases, and Reagan appointees did so in only 41%. Id. This general trend was confirmed by Professor
Pierce in his study of the D.C. Circuit in the mid-I 980s. See Pierce, supra note 6, at 307 n.41.
62. A possible exception is a recent study by Professor Richard Revesz. See Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). Professor
Revesz's study was designed to determine the influence of judicial ideology on the outcomes of
challenges to environmental regulation. See id. at 1718. After examining approximately 250 of the
challenges to EPA action that were litigated in the D.C. Circuit between 1970 and 1994, Professor
Revesz concluded that ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking in the field of
environmental regulation. See id. at 1719. Although the scope of Professor Revesz's study was not
limited to Chevron challenges, the fact that such ideological voting was found after 1984 suggests that
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judges are more likely to apply Chevron if they approve of the politics of the
administration, and none has studied whether they are more likely to defer
when they do.
C. The Interpretive Model
Unlike the contextual and political models, the interpretive approach does
not view the two-step test as a ritual that hides the true nature of judicial
review. Instead, the interpretive model accepts that judges take Chevron
seriously-that they try to apply the two-step formula as objectively as
possible. As a result, the model accepts that judicial review under Chevron is
governed by the language of the two-step test, and nothing but the two-step
test."3 The challenge posed by the interpretive model, then, is not to the
doctrine's integrity, but rather its stability. The central claim of the
interpretive model is that outcomes of judicial review within the new Chevron
paradigm are influenced strongly by methods of statutory interpretation
adopted by individual judges.64 If deference kicks in when a statute is found to
be ambiguous, then a judge's theory of when ambiguity exists assumes
paramount importance.65 Judges who find ambiguity more often than others
will defer more often, expanding executive power, whereas judges who see
less ambiguity will tend to reduce executive power.
The interpretive method targeted by most proponents of the interpretive
model is textualism. Roughly speaking, textualist approaches seek statutory
meaning in the language of the statutory text itself, without reference to non-
textual sources such as legislative history.66 Although not all proponents of the
interpretive model agree on how textualism impacts Chevron deference,67 the
majority argue that textualist approaches lead to less deference than
intentionalist or dynamic theories of interpretation.6 The best-known
expression of the majority view appears in a speech delivered by Justice
Antonin Scalia at Duke Law School in January, 1989:
we should expect judicial ideology to affect the outcomes of Chevron cases. But see Jerome Nelson, The
Chevron Deference Rule and Judicial Review of FERC Orders, 9 ENERGY L.J. 59, 82 (1988) (examining
18 Chevron cases involving Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders and suggesting that
the ideological orientation of the judges did not affect outcomes).
63. See Werhan, supra note 5, at 567-68. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2119-20 (1990) (discussing whether the
Chevron test has truly replaced other canons of judicial review).
64. See supra note 7 for articles that rely on the interpretive model.
65. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 5, at 990 ("In short, under the two-step Chevron framework,
everything turns on the theory of judicial interpretation adopted at step one.").
66. For a general discussion of textualism and its alternatives, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
67. See Maggs, supra note 7, at 393-95 (documenting the inconsistency of the interpretive
model's attacks on textualism).
68. See id.
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[W]here one stands on [matters of statutory interpretation]-how
clear is clear-may have much to do with where one stands on...
what Chevron means and whether Chevron is desirable. In my
experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to
which a person is (for want of a better word) a "strict constructionist"
of statutes, and the degree to which that person favors Chevron and is
willing to give it broad scope. The reason is obvious. One who finds
more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its
text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often
that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists ...
Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule, and is willing
to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the
legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating
ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of "reasonable"
interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the courts must
pay deference.69
Many followers of the interpretive model agree with Justice Scalia's
conclusion that textualist judges defer to executive interpretations less often
than do others.7" Most do not consider this to be a good thing, however; they
argue that the "strict constructionist" approaches popular among conservative
federal judges such as Justice Scalia will lead courts to interfere with agency
actions improperly.7 Instead of respecting agency spheres of expertise, it is
believed, textualist judges will go to great lengths to author "intricate and
imaginative opinions that ... support a [false] conclusion that an ambiguous
statute has a single plain meaning."72 Finding a plain meaning then allows
textualist judges to decide matters for themselves, instead of respecting the
agency's expert judgment.7" By routinely attributing plain meaning to
statutory language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous,
textualist judges threaten to "virtually emasculat[e] the Chevron doctrine."74
A significant minority among the proponents of the interpretive paradigm
assert the opposite claim-namely, that textualist methods cause excessive
69. Scalia, supra note 7, at 521.
70. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 876-78 (summarizing arguments); Bell, supra note
7, at 132-33; Herz, supra note 7, at 1670-72; Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 460-61; Mank, supra note 7,
at 1248-50; Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at 752.
71. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 7, at 1670-72 (discussing how the textualist approaches of
Reagan-appointed judges such as Justice Scalia and Judge Alex Kozinski lead them to defer only rarely
to agency interpretations).
72. Pierce, Legislative Reform, supra note 6, at 1125. Professor Pierce also makes the dubious
claim that textualism exacerbates serious workload problems on the federal bench because the time and
effort required of textualists to resolve Chevron questions at the first step are overburdening. See id.
73. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 7, at 1278-84 (maintaining that textualist approaches to Chevron
lead judges to make decisions that should be left to agencies because the agencies have substantial
expertise and judges do not).
74. Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at 752.
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deference to agency views." According to these commentators, textualist
judges' reluctance to seek meaning in legislative history leaves them without
an important tool to discern whether Congress has spoken to the direct issue at
Chevron's first step.76 Textualist. judges are believed to find ambiguity
unusually often, leading to excessive deference and an "exalt[ing of]
presidential power at the expense of the other branches.""
The interpretive model is best understood as a byproduct of the central
legal debate of the last several decades: how strictly or loosely to interpret
constitutional text.78 Within this paradigm, it is axiomatic that a judge's
interpretive approach is a telltale indicator of the results that the judge will
tend to reach in constitutional cases.79 When applied to the statutory realm
during the 1980s, this insight triggered a rethinking of the strengths and
weaknesses of various approaches to statutory interpretation.80 The statutory
debate largely traces the constitutional one: Those who advocate a "strict"
interpretation of constitutional text are generally attracted to the notion of
looking for and adhering to statutory "plain meaning," and those who
advocate going beyond the four comers of the Constitution are less likely to
look for or feel bound by statutory plain meaning.8' The interpretive model of
Chevron applies this framework to judicial review of agency action by
assuming that methods of interpreting statutory text exert a measurable effect
upon outcomes. Because Chevron deference requires a judicial finding of
statutory ambiguity, followers of the interpretive model quite naturally look to
interpretive methods to determine when that will happen. Followers of
different interpretive traditions will approach text differently, which in turn
determines whether agency-liberating ambiguity is found, which in turn
75. The inconsistent attacks on textualism's effect upon the Chevron doctrine are well-
documented in Maggs, supra note 7, at 393-95.
76. See Mashaw, supra note 7, at 836; Stock, supra note 7, at 160; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 430
n.91. A related point is made in Mark Burge, Note, Regulatory Reform and the Chevron Doctrine: Can
Congress Force Better Decisionmaking by Courts and Agencies?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1085, 1094-103
(1997) (arguing that Chevron is unstable because judges use inconsistent canons of statutory
construction to determine whether Congress has spoken at step one).
77. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 57. Conversely, from a textualist perspective, those judges who
rely on nontextual sources such as legislative history to create statutory meaning are guilty of judicial
overreaching. See Garre, supra note 7, at 970-71.
78. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980) (portraying the debate as being
between those who believe that "judges deciding constitutional norms should confine themselves to
enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution," and those who believe
that "courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within
the four comers of the document").
79. Compare the results endorsed in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1978)
(arguing generally that constitutional text must be interpreted broadly, not as laying down particular
conceptions) to those endorsed in ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990) (arguing
generally that interpretations of constitutional text must be strictly limited by the original, particular
intent of the Framers).
80. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
81. See Scalia, supra note 7, at 521.
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determines whether agency interpretations are upheld.
Proponents of the interpretive model maintain two related empirical
claims. The first and primary claim has already been discussed: It asserts that
textualist judges applying Chevron will accept executive interpretations at a
different rate (whether higher or lower) than will non-textualist judges.8 2
Professor Gregory Maggs recently evaluated this position by studying the
voting patterns of one prominent textualist, Justice Antonin Scalia. Professor
Maggs found that Justice Scalia accepted agency interpretations in Chevron
cases about as often as he rejected them.83 Although the study did not directly
address how Justice Scalia's acceptance rate compared to those of other
Justices, it did find that Justice Scalia usually sided with the majority in
Chevron cases.84 In more than fifty cases, Justice Scalia wrote or joined only
five dissents and two partial dissents.85 The author concluded that Justice
Scalia's textualism did not lead him to defer more or less often than did other
Justices. 6
The second claim of the interpretive model is that textualist judges will be
less inclined than will non-textualist judges to apply deference doctrines such
as Chevron. According to Professor Merrill, the primary proponent of this
view, textualism exists in considerable tension with the Chevron mindset.8 7
The former relies upon an active and creative judicial role, in which meaning
is discovered by a clever judge; the latter is based upon a passive judicial role,
in which the courts defer to other institutions. As a result, textualist judges
will be less likely to "think Chevron," and therefore less prone than other
judges to apply its principles.8
Professor Merrill attempted to test his theory empirically by studying the
usage of legislative history and applications of Chevron by the Supreme
Court.89 The study compared the frequency of judicial reliance on legislative
history to the frequency of cases decided under deference principles. The
hypothesis was that decreasing use of legislative history over time could be
explained by an increasing use of textualism, which would be expected to
correspond to fewer applications of Chevron and related deference doctrines.9"
Professor Merrill found that the Court decreasingly relied upon legislative
history as the 1980s progressed, which he correlated-albeit very
tentatively-with decreasing reliance upon principles of deference to agency
82. See Maggs, supra note 7, at 393-95.
83. See id at 409.
84. See id. at 413.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 417.
87. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 372.
88. See id.; see also Edwin A. Keller, Jr., Comment, Death by Textualism: The NLRB s
"Incidental to Patient Care" Supervisory Status Test for Charge Nurses, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 575, 613-16
(1996).
89. See Merrill, supra note 7.
90. See id. at 353.
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interpretations of law.9 From this, Merrill suggested that textualist judges
were less inclined to apply Chevron and other deference principles than were
non-textualist judges.92
Although both Professor Maggs's and Professor Merrill's results are
suggestive, neither responds authoritatively to the questions posed by the
interpretive model. Professor Maggs' study would have been more persuasive
had he compared directly the deference rates of textualist judges such as
Justice Scalia to those of non-textualist judges. Without such direct
comparison, it is difficult to see whether Justice Scalia's fifty-percent
deference rate is unusually high, unusually low, or average.93 Professor
Merrill's study would have been more convincing if the data supporting his
conclusion had been stronger,94 and if he had studied the caseload of a court
without entirely discretionary jurisdiction.95 In light of these weaknesses, the
questions posed by the empirical claims of the interpretive model cannot yet
be considered fully answered.
II. Methodology
As with all empirical research, the results of this study are only as useful
as the methodology is sound. The purpose of this part is to explore and
explain the study's methodology in order to understand both the significance
and the limitations of the results it produces.
91. See id at 361-62.
92. See id at 373.
93. Professor Maggs recognized this. See Maggs, supra note 7, at 412.
94. Professor Merrill's conclusion that deference doctrines such as Chevron were on the wane in
the late 1980s and early 1990s rests on fairly weak foundations. Professor Merrill based his conclusion
on the fact that during the 1992 Term, only two of the eight cases that mentioned deference actually
"turned in any significant degree on" deference to agiency interpretations of law. Merrill, supra note 7, at
362. By comparison, from 1984 to 1990, 90 cases had mentioned the deference principle, an average of
almost 13 cases per Term. See id. at 359. Professor Merrill argues that the small number of cases decided
upon deference principles during the 1992 Term reveals "a dramatic reduction in the incidence of the use
of the [deference] doctrine relative to what we have witnessed throughout most of the modem era." Id. at
362.
Professor Merrill's analysis rests upon the assumption that a court's tendency to mention deference
without deciding the case on deference principles suggests that the court is oriented away from
deference. If anything, one would think that a court's tendency to mention deference when it was not
needed to resolve the case before it reveals a tendency toward applying deference principles. In any
event, Professor Merrill's data show that the number of applications of Chevron itself did not drop to an
unusually low level in the 1992 Term. See id at 359-60. Finally, Professor Merrill's conclusion does not
appear to be supported by data from any Term other than the 1992 Term. See id
95. Whether a court finds that its cases raise issues of deference depends on the court's docket,
which in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court is determined by the entirely discretionary certiorari
process. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S TIHE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 37-38 (4th ed. 1996) (describing the certiorari process). As a result, the Supreme
Court's failure to rely upon deference principles in a given Term is most easily explained by the Court's
decision to grant certiorari in only a few deference cases that Term. Cf. Strauss, supra note 38, at 1121
(arguing that the relative consistency of results brought about under Chevron allows the post-Chevron
Supreme Court to review fewer deference cases than before).
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To evaluate the challenges to the integrity and stability of the Chevron
doctrine posed by the contextual, political, and interpretive models, I studied
every published Chevron opinion decided by the United States Courts of
Appeals during the years 1995 and 1996. 1 chose to study courts of appeals
decisions because the bulk of Chevron activity is there-the doctrine is
applied more often in published courts of appeals decisions than in the
published decisions of either federal district courts or the Supreme Court."
My goal was first to locate and then to evaluate every application of the
Chevron doctrine in order to determine whether the challenges mounted by the
three models were valid. In this part I first explain the criteria used to define a
bona fide application of Chevron for the purposes of the study. Next, I discuss
how the data from the Chevron applications were used to assess each of the
three models.
A. Defining a Chevron Application
Because the purpose of this study is to find out what courts really do
when they apply the Chevron doctrine, the study's methodological foundation
is the counting of applications of the two-step doctrine, rather than of the
cases that include such applications. Counting applications is superior to
counting cases for two important reasons. First, the outcomes of Chevron
cases are sometimes determined by issues that have nothing to do with the
standard of review of agency interpretations of law; a court's willingness to
uphold an agency's view does not preclude the court from ruling against the
agency on other grounds.97 Studying how courts resolve specific Chevron
disputes, rather than the cases that contain them, is likely to reflect more
accurately judicial understandings of how Chevron is to be applied.98 Second,
96. A Westlaw search reveals that in 1995 and 1996, Chevron was cited by courts of appeals in
418 cases, by district courts in 346 cases, and by the Supreme Court in 17 cases. Search of Westlaw,
CTA, DCT & SCT Databases (Dec. 1I, 1997).
97. For example, a court could accept an agency's interpretation of a statute under Chevron, but
find that the interpretation was included in a rule that was arbitrary and capricious under the standard of
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass 'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
98. Granted, counting Chevron applications instead of cases may overestimate the degree to
which applications of Chevron represent independent applications of the doctrine. Judicial decisions can
be the product of compromise, and we may be so cynical as to recognize that sometimes judicial
opinions are the contingent products of a result in search of a rationale. See Jerome Frank, Why Not a
Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 911 (1933) (maintaining that a judicial opinion is "a
censored exposition, written by a judge, of what induced him to arrive at a decision which he has already
reached"); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEO. WASi. L.
REV. 821, 828 (1990) (noting that judges "too often do not truthfully explain their reasoning" when
reviewing agency action). A study counting cases instead of applications is less vulnerable to this charge
because who wins and who loses has obvious real-world importance.
Fortunately, the difference between the two was minimized by the fact that I found relatively few
cases in which the outcomes of the Chevron application did not match the outcome of the case.
Furthermore, the critique of judicial opinions as contingent also attacks the case-counting approach. As
long as a methodology relies in part on what arguments are put forth in the opinion (such as whether the
case involves Chevron review at all), this argument applies to some degree.
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counting applications is superior to counting cases because many cases
include more than one application of the two-step doctrine. Some cases
include multiple Chevron analyses, in which the agency view is upheld in one
or more applications, but rejected in others.99 By treating discrete applications
of Chevron as discrete data points, the chosen methodology tracks judicial
efforts to grapple with agency interpretations of law more faithfully than
would counting by cases.
The decision to count by applications posed the next methodological
problem: How to define a Chevron application. The standard was selected
with three criteria in mind. First, the standard had to be as objective as
possible; second, the standard had to introduce as few systematic biases as
possible; and third, the standard had to exclude cases in which the doctrine
was mentioned, but was not actually applied. In response to these three
criteria, I established the following standard. A section of a judicial opinion
counted as a Chevron application if and only if:
1) the litigation involved either an appeal from an agency adjudication
or a direct challenge to an agency regulation concerning a federal
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency was
entrusted to administer;
2) the majority opinion cited Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. '00 for the standard of review; and
3) a discussion of the agency's interpretation appeared in the majority
opinion, and the discussion either accepted or rejected the
interpretation at Chevron's first step, or else accepted or rejected the
agency interpretation under the "reasonable" standard of step two.
Element (1) was necessary in order to filter out uses of Chevron in a
variety of questionable and controversial circumstances that go beyond the
doctrine's original scope. For example, the Chevron formula is occasionally
used as an interpretive aid in litigation between private parties;'' in attempts
to understand the United States Sentencing Guidelines in criminal cases;0 2
99. See, e.g., Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding two EPA interpretations of
the Clean Air Act and rejecting one).
100. 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
101. See, e.g., Phillips Co. v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 1375, 1377 (10th
Cir. 1996) (applying Chevron formula to quiet title in private action).
102. See, e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1403-08 (1st Cir. 1995) (interpreting the
United States Sentencing Guidelines), revd 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997). The Supreme Court's majority
opinion did not reach the question of whether Chevron should be applied to administrative
interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines. See LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1679.
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and as a tool to review the legal interpretations of state agencies.I°3 Depending
on one's view of Chevron's optimal scope, these applications may or may not
be proper.'0 4 However, the fact that these applications are not widespread
suggests that to include them in a study of the Chevron doctrine would
introduce a systematic bias that is better avoided. For example, in litigation
between two private parties, a judge might invoke Chevron if the judge
happened to agree with the agency interpretation, but not if the judge
disagreed with the agency. The result would be an artificially high acceptance
rate. Of course, it is possible that judges could do the same with Chevron in
less controversial areas, but Chevron's wide acceptance in the courts for
review of agency action minimizes this concern.' 5 Element (1) thus excludes
marginal cases and limits the study to appeals from adverse agency
adjudications and direct challenges to agency regulations.'0 6
Element (2) requires the case in which the application appears to cite
Chevron specifically. This requirement arises out of the need to establish
simple and reasonably objective criteria for inclusion in the study. Of course,
whether a judge applying the two-step formula cites Chevron or a subsequent
case is entirely arbitrary, and disregarding those cases that do not cite Chevron
excludes cases that apply the test in substance, if not in name. 7 However,
excluding all cases that fail to cite Chevron is helpful because it dramatically
simplifies the search for applications. A standard that includes all applications
of two-step tests that resemble Chevron would be difficult to monitor: It
would require plowing through thousands of individual cases for those that
replicate the two-step test. Because there is no reason to believe that the cases
that cite Chevron are systematically different from those that apply an
identical standard without citing the case, Element (2) should present an
accurate picture of the Chevron world which can be extrapolated to cases that
do not cite the case itself. 8 The added requirement that applications cite the
103. See, e.g., Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Chevron-type
analysis to a state agency's interpretation of the Social Security Act).
104. Chevron's apparent capacity to take on new life in a variety of contexts has been discussed
in recent scholarship such as Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing that the Department of Justice (DOJ) should be the primary source of
interpretations of federal criminal law, and that courts should review DOJ interpretations under the
Chevron standard).
105. Cf DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at § 3.6 (stating that circuit courts almost invariably
apply Chevron's two-step framework).
106. As a result, in most cases the government agency, its chief administrator, or the United
States is a named party in the appellate litigation.
107. Indeed, studies of judicial deference in Supreme Court opinions generally have attempted to
include cases that apply a Chevron-like framework even if the cases do not cite Chevron itself. See, e.g.,
Maggs, supra note 7, at 408; Merrill, supra note 5, at 981 n.53. Such an approach is feasible in a study
of Supreme Court cases, given the Court's limited docket, but it would be impracticable in a study of
circuit court cases.
108. Of course, it is possible that some judges will cite Chevron merely as lip service when they
vote to uphold, an agency interpretation. See Silberman, supra note 98, at 827. However, it is also
possible that they will cite Chevron when they vote to reject an agency interpretation. Furthermore,
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case specificallyfor the standard of review is meant to be relatively weak. The
opinion need not state explicitly that the two-step formula provides the
standard of review; rather, the requirement is merely designed to exclude
cases in which Chevron is clearly being cited for an unrelated proposition.
The purpose of Element (3) is to define the depth of judicial review
necessary for the citation to constitute a Chevron application. I deliberately
chose a relatively liberal standard. For example, this standard includes the
common judicial practice of condensing Chevron's two-step formula into a
single inquiry into "reasonability" or "permissibility."' 9 Because this test is
functionally identical to the two-step formulation,"' the study includes them
as Chevron applications. One complication arising from the liberal
construction of Element (3) was the question of how to apply it to cases that
included several potential Chevron applications. In particular, I was concerned
that applying the standard indiscriminately would overcount and thus
overemphasize the importance of a few heavily litigated cases in which many
agency interpretations were challenged at once. Heavily litigated cases could
include frivolous claims, to which a court might respond by raising and
quickly dismissing a host of Chevron issues. The result would be an
artificially high rate of acceptance of agency interpretations. In order to
counteract this effect, multiple Chevron applications were counted within a
single case only when it seemed clear from the opinion that each application
was analyzed separately, and that the citation to Chevron was not simply a
passing comment.'"
Although every attempt was made to delineate carefully the required
parameters for inclusion in this study, it must be emphasized that defining a
Chevron application proved to be a subjective and difficult task." 2 Of
particular concern is the possibility of bias. It is a central tenet of empirical
research that one who conducts an experiment should not be aware of the
hypothesis that the study seeks to evaluate if the criteria for selecting the
absent reliance on the court's own statement of the basis of its opinion, it would be impossible to
determine when the court is applying the Chevron framework at all. Possible judicial reluctance to
explain honestly the basis of decisions is a limitation inherent in all empirical research of this type. See
id. at 828 (stating that judges "too often do not truthfully explain their reasoning" when reviewing
agency action).
109. In fact, my study found that 28% of Chevron applications are resolved using this condensed
test. See infra Part Ill.
110. See Byse, supra note 5, at 256.
111. This subjective "ratcheting-up" of the standard was subsequently validated by the fact that
the acceptance rate of agency interpretations in cases with multiple applications matched that in cases
with only a single application. The overall acceptance rate for applications in both categories was 73%.
The agency's interpretation was accepted in 36 of 49 applications in multiple-application cases, and 149
of 204 applications in single-application cases.
112. This difficulty seems to be part and parcel of this type of empirical work. Cf Merrill, supra
note 5, at 981-82 n.53 (acknowledging that Professor Merrill's definition of a Chevron application is
"highly subjective," involving "determin[ing] whether the author of the controlling opinion was thinking
about Chevron in setting forth the analysis of deference").
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sample are subjective; knowledge of the hypothesis creates biases in the study
itself in favor of finding the hypothesis to be true." 3 Unfortunately, like most
others who have published empirical studies in this field, I was unable to
comply with this tenet."4 However, it is hoped that any bias inherent in the
endeavor was minimized by the study's attempt to test several hypotheses at
once. Because the outcomes predicted by the different models were often in
conflict, it was significantly less likely that bias in favor of one or all of the
models would distort the results of the study than would have been the case
had only one hypothesis been tested."5
B. Designing the Tests
With the framework for analyzing Chevron applications in place, the next
challenge was to devise tests to evaluate the claims of the contextual, political,
and interpretive models. As the scarcity of conclusive empirical work on
Chevron might suggest, this proved a difficult task. Accordingly, I placed a
high priority on developing a methodology able to test each model's claims as
faithfully as possible.
1. The Contextual Model
The goal of testing the contextual model was to see whether and how
judicial acceptance rates changed when traditional factors were present or
absent. The study focused upon three traditional factors: whether the agency's
construction was rendered contemporaneously with the statute's passage;
whether the agency's construction was of longstanding application; and
whether the agency maintained its position consistently over time. According
113. See R. CLAY SPROWLS, ELEMENTARY SrATISTICS 117 (1955) ("A researcher with a vested
interest in a problem cannot be trusted to select by judgment the sample to be used in the test.").
114. Data selection in previous empirical studies appears to have been conducted by the authors
of the articles in which the studies appeared. These include Maggs, supra note 7; Merrill, supra note 5;
and Tomasi & Velona, supra note 61. Having spent hundreds of hours reading and analyzing cases for
this study, I promise that I would have gladly passed off the job to another had I been given the
opportunity to do so.
115. The bias here relates almost entirely to the question of whether to count a reported decision
as a Chevron application when it is unclear whether the court has applied Chevron. For example,
imagine that the question was whether to count as a Chevron application a case in which a politically
conservative, textualist Reagan appointee authored an opinion upholding an agency's denial of welfare
benefits. Imagine further that the court's reported decision suggests indirectly that the court's rationale
was an application of Chevron; although the opinion is not entirely clear, it is reasonable to conclude
that the court considered the statute ambiguous and the agency construction reasonable. A subconscious
bias in favor of validating the political model would influence the individual conducting the study to
count the application because it would tend to validate the political model-a conservative judge had
reached a conservative result. However, a subconscious bias in favor of the interpretive model would
influence the author not to count the case, as the interpretive model generally predicts that textualist
judges will not find statutes to be ambiguous. The effect of testing several empirical claims at once was
to make it substantially less likely that a subconscious desire to prove any of the models correct would
distort the results.
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to the contextual model, contemporaneous, longstanding, and consistent rules
should be upheld more frequently than others."6 These three factors were
selected because they are particularly conducive to objective measurement. It
would have been ideal to measure many more, if not all, of the traditional
factors; however, many of the traditional factors are sufficiently elastic so as
to defy objective analysis. For example, it proved impossible to determine
whether an agency interpretation was based on expertise or involved a
technical and complex subject. By contrast, it was possible to formulate
objective tests that tracked relatively closely the substantive concerns of the
three selected traditional factors.
To study whether contemporaneous agency interpretations received more
deference than later interpretations, I recorded the year in which each
challenged regulation was published as a final rule and compared it to the year
in which the relevant portion of the associated statutory text was passed." 7 For
the purposes of this study, it was assumed that a contemporaneous
interpretation is one that was published as a final rule very soon after the
relevant bill became law; a non-contemporaneous interpretation would be one
that appeared as a final rule many years later. Granted, appearance in the
Federal Register as a final rule is not a perfect indicator of the true timing of
an agency's adoption of a particular construction, because an agency
informally can adopt an interpretation long before it appears in the form of a
final rule. However, federal law mandates that no regulation can become
effective until thirty days after it is published in the Federal Register."'
Consequently, using the date of publication as the "date of birth" for each rule
will be accurate in most cases. Using this date allows a comparison of the
acceptance rates of contemporaneous interpretations with those of later ones
by comparing the acceptance rates of those interpretations promulgated soon
116. See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 2101. The rationale for this heightened deference is
somewhat unclear, but the most common explanation is that longstanding and consistent rules deserve
more respect because they are more likely to have prompted reliance interests, and that contemporaneous
interpretations deserve more respect because they are more likely to reflect Congressional will, since
they were adopted in the same political milieu as was the statute. See id
117. I did not do the same for challenged adjudications because there was no simple way to
determine the date of the initial adoption of an agency's view adopted by adjudication.
I identified the date of passage of the statutory text by studying the United States Code Annotated,
the notes in which describe how the relevant sections of the statute changed over time. By using the
notes, it is relatively straightforward to identify the date of passage of the particular word or phrase of
statutory text that a regulation interprets. Similarly, I determined the year of promulgation of each
regulation by looking up each in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). I considered the date of
promulgation of each rule to be the date on which the rule was published in the Federal Register. The
C.F.R. cites to the Federal Register, setting forth the date of the promulgation of the final rule of each
regulation. When a regulation had been amended, I consulted the Federal Register itself to determine the
year in which the particular interpretation being challenged first appeared in the form of a final rule.
118. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1994). See generally JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING, AND DEFENDING FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS 144-47 (1983)
(discussing the relationship between the effective dates of final rules and their publication in the Federal
Register).
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after statutory passage with those of interpretations promulgated many years
later.
I assessed whether longstanding agency interpretations were upheld more
frequently than recently-adopted interpretations by determining how many
years had passed between the publication of each challenged final rule and the
publication of the appellate opinion evaluating the challenge. That is, the
study looks at whether the regulation, not the interpretation, was longstanding.
The date of the final rule may not always correspond to the date that the
interpretation was adopted, but using the date of the final rule permits a simple
test of whether longstanding interpretations receive greater deference under
Chevron-namely, a comparison of the acceptance rates of older rules with
those of more recent ones.
Assessing whether consistent interpretations were upheld more frequently
than inconsistent ones required scanning each opinion for mention of changes
in the agency's interpretation over time. If the opinion did not mention any
changes, it was assumed that the agency's interpretation was consistent;
otherwise, the agency's position was deemed inconsistent. I then compared
the acceptance rates of the applications in the two groups. Limiting the
investigation to the text of the opini6n itself has an obvious flaw: A court will
not always mention whether the agency's interpretation was inconsistent. In
fact, because one would expect a court to be more likely to mention that an
interpretation was inconsistent when the court decides to reject an agency's
interpretation, reliance on the opinion's text should tend to underestimate the
acceptance rate of inconsistent interpretations. Nevertheless, I felt forced to
adopt this approach because it would have been impractical to conduct
independent investigations into the histories of 253 agency interpretations.
Thus, this test is used with the understanding that it at best can disprove the
hypothesis that inconsistent interpretations are upheld less often than
consistent ones." 19
2. The Political Model
Assessing the political model's structural claims required examining
whether judges were more likely to apply and defer under Chevron when
reviewing interpretations produced by same-party executives. This in turn
required formulating ways to determine each judge's party; the administration
that produced each interpretation; and how likely a judge was to apply and
defer under Chevron.
I assigned a party affiliation to the author of each opinion by assuming
119. That is, if the test itself tends to underestimate the acceptance rate of inconsistent
interpretations, then a finding that the acceptance rate of inconsistent interpretations is the same as those
of consistent ones would seem to disprove the hypothesis that inconsistently held interpretations receive
less deference.
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that judges were members of the same party as the Presidents who appointed
them. 2' This is true in all but a few cases, as only seven of the 189 circuit
judges appointed from 1977 to 1995 did not come from the party of the
appointing President.'2
It proved more difficult to assign each interpretation to a particular
administration. Unable to research the history of each agency action, I opted
for two simple conventions. First, I assumed that all agency adjudications
reviewed in 1995 and 1996 were the products of Clinton-era agencies. There
may have been a few Bush-era adjudications that were not reviewed by the
circuit courts until 1995, but there were probably only a handful. Second, I
assumed that regulations were promulgated by the administration in office
during the majority of the year in which the final rule was published. For
example, I assumed that all regulations promulgated from 1977 through 1980
were Carter-era rules; that all final rules issued from 1981 through 1992 were
Reagan and Bush-era regulations; and that all regulations promulgated in 1993
or later were the products of the Clinton administration. This convention is
imperfect because it fails to account for rules promulgated in the last few
weeks of each administration, and also for those created by one administration
but put into effect by another. However, in most cases it should properly
identify the administration responsible for each regulation.1
22
I determined whether Republican or Democratic judges were more likely
to apply Chevron by comparing the proportion of applications authored by
active judges appointed by a particular President to the proportion of active
circuit judges appointed by that President.22 By collecting the sums for both
parties, I could then see whether Democratic or GOP judges were more or less
likely to apply Chevron. The theory is that judges who are more likely to
apply the doctrine will author more opinions applying it than their
120. This proxy has been used before. See e.g., Revesz, supra note 62, at 1718 n.6.
121. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection under Clinton.- A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276, 287 (1995). According to Goldman's statistics, Clinton appointed one Republican;
Bush two Democrats; and Carter four Republicans to the courts of appeals. See id.
122. See generally O'REILLY, supra note 118, at 144-47 (describing the relationship between the
creation and implementation of a rule and the date of its publication as a final rule in the Federal
Register).
123. If an opinion was signed, I used 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1996) to determine
which President appointed its author. In the case of per curiam opinions, I adopted the following
convention. If all judges on a panel were appointed by the same President, I would record the opinion as
having been authored by an appointee of that President. See, e.g., Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89
F.3d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (a panel consisting of three Reagan appointees). If all judges on a
panel were appointed by a President of the same party, and the majority of the judges were appointed by
a single President, I would record the opinion as having been authored by an appointee of the President
who appointed the majority. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam) (a panel consisting of two Reagan appointees and one Bush appointee). In all other
cases, I excluded the opinion from the relevant section of the study. See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper
Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (a panel consisting
of one Bush appointee, one Reagan appointee, and one Clinton appointee).
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representative proportion of the active judge pool would suggest.'24 For
example, a group that comprises 20% of the active judges, but authors 40% of
the applications of the doctrine in the study, can be said to be particularly
Chevron-prone.
To calculate the proportion of all active circuit judges appointed by each
President, I went one step beyond simply tabulating the distribution of active
judges during the period of the study.1 2' The problem with simple tabulation is
that it fails to acknowledge that the distribution of judges in some circuits is
more important than in others. For example, the distribution of judges in the
D.C. Circuit is unusually important.'26 To correct for the unequal Chevron
caseload in the different circuits, I calculated a weighted proportion by circuit
for each set of judges. Thus, the distribution of judges on a circuit with a
Chevron caseload twice as heavy as another is considered twice as
important. 27 Using the weighted proportion allows a more direct comparison
between the actual proportion of Chevron opinions each group authored and
the proportions we would expect them to author if all groups were equally
likely to apply the doctrine.
The individual hypothesis of the political model asserts that liberal judges
will use the doctrine to reach liberal results, and that conservative jurists will
reach conservative results. Following my earlier convention, I assumed that
Democrat-appointed judges are political liberals and that GOP appointees are
political conservatives. Although this is an oversimplification, it will be
124. Authorship of majority Chevron opinions is of course not a perfect indicator of whether a
given judicial group was Chevron-prone; the views ofjudges who often write in dissent, or who choose
not to write opinions on agency questions generally, will be underrepresented. However, the very low
frequency of dissents in circuit court cases, combined with the absence of a reason to think that judges
appointed by any particular President would be more or less attracted to agency cases, suggests that the
proportion of authorship of the study's Chevron opinions accurately reflects each group's overall
tendency to apply the doctrine.
125. 1 calculated the flat proportion of active circuit judges appointed by each President by using
a Federal Reporter volume covering cases at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996. 1 selected 72
F.3d at vii-xv, which revealed that, in the middle of the study period, there were 30 active Clinton circuit
judges, 40 active Bush judges, 65 active Reagan judges, 25 active Carter judges, 2 active Ford judges, 3
active Nixon judges, and I active judge from each of the Johnson, Kennedy, and Eisenhower
administrations. See 72 F.3d at vii-xv.
I did not count senior circuit judges, because they generally take a lighter caseload than active
judges. Without knowing the caseload of each senior judge, it would have been difficult to figure out
how many opinions their numbers should have produced if the null hypothesis (that all judges apply
Chevron equally often) were true.
126. The D.C. Circuit decides an inordinately large share of Chevron cases. It also, for example,
has no active judges appointed before the Carter administration. Because about 5% of the active
appellate judiciary is pre-Carter, the heavy D.C. Circuit caseload could create a false impression that
pre-Carter judges are not as willing as later appointed judges to apply Chevron.
127. In theory, there is a shade of circularity in this test; if different judges approach Chevron
very differently, the mix of judges in a circuit will affect the circuit's load. In practice, however, the
effect is infinitesimal, as the flat and weighted proportions proved to be within 1% of each other in each
case. From note 125, supra, we can see that 17.8% of active judges are Clinton appointees; 23.8%, Bush
appointees; 38.7%, Reagan; and 14.9%, Carter. These figures are nearly identical to the weighted
proportions calculated and shown in Chart 9, p. 41, infra.
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accurate in most cases: circuit judges typically are former party activists of the
appointing president's party, 2 ' and assertions that circuit judges are appointed
to further political agendas are all too common.'29
Sorting outcomes into liberal and conservative results required adopting a
simple convention. Although the political spectrum in the United States does
not often divide neatly along conservative/liberal lines, I was able to classify
outcomes as either liberal or conservative in several substantive areas that
altogether included about 75% of the applications in the study. Specifically, it
was assumed for the purposes of this study that liberal outcomes were those
that furthered the causes of environmental protection, immigration,
entitlement benefits, government regulation of business, and employees'
rights against employers. Decisions that impeded these causes were classified
as conservative. 30 Six types of cases emerged in which rejection of an
agency's view generally led to a liberal result: individual entitlement benefits
cases (typically involving an agency's denial of benefits); immigration cases
(typically reviewing an agency's denial of asylum to an individual);
environmental challenges by public interest groups (such as a suit by the
Sierra Club to block lax environmental regulations); suits by employees,
unions, and public interest groups alleging health, safety, or labor law
violations, often in the workplace; suits by hospitals seeking reimbursement
for Medicare/Medicaid expenses; and suits involving law enforcement or
parole questions. Rejection of an agency's interpretation led to conservative
results in four categories. The most common was the umbrella category of
economic matters, which included commerce, trade issues, tariffs, taxes,
finance, and customs issues. These cases typically were appeals by
corporations seeking to avoid having to pay fees, taxes, or tariffs levied by an
agency. The other three categories were corporate challenges to environmental
rulings; corporate challenges to health, safety, and labor rulings; and
challenges by states against federal regulations.
128. See Goldman, supra note 121, at 280 tbl.2 (showing that about 60% of Carter, Reagan, and
Bush-appointees, and about 50% of Clinton appointees, have histories of party activism).
129. See, e.g., Tomasi & Velona, supra note 61, at 766-70 (reviewing the Reagan
administration's judicial philosophy and the reactions to it); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, TIlE FEDERAL
COURTS: CIALLENGE AND REFORM 18 (1996) (noting the Reagan administration's attempt to shift the
judiciary to the right following the appointment of "notably liberal" Carter judges). Although this might
suggest that Reagan and Bush judges are more conservative than the appointees of previous Republican
administrations, Tomasi and Velona's data suggest that the voting behavior of all Republican appointees
was fairly similar, and that that of all Democratic appointees was also fairly consistent. See Tomasi &
Velona, supra note 61, at 779. My own data also supported this conclusion. Consequently, I have
compared the voting patterns of Republican and Democratic judges instead of the voting pattems of
judges of particular Presidential appointments.
130. See generally Nt'wT GINGRICH, To RINEW AMERICA (1995) (advocating a brand of political
conservatism that trumpets free market economics, the end of the welfare state, and limited
immigration).
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3. The Interpretive Model
According to the interpretive model, judges from different interpretive
schools apply Chevron differently. To ascertain whether this is true, it was
necessary to assign each judge to an interpretive school. Making an individual
determination for each judge proved a daunting task; each judge is unique,
and few judges have written opinions or articles consistently endorsing
particular approaches to statutory interpretation. Also, because the sample size
of the study was too small to use results based on only a very limited subset of
judges with known views, I needed a convention to assign each judge to an
interpretive school.
The critical insight to the solution of this problem was that there should be
a significant correlation between judges' interpretive philosophies and the
Presidents who appointed them. Specifically, textualism is strongly associated
with Reagan and Bush judges, 3' and more dynamic forms of statutory
interpretation are known to be more popular among appointees of Democratic
Presidents.'32 Of course, this does not mean that all Reagan and Bush judges
are strict textualists, but it does mean that enough are influenced by the
textualist mindset that the voting patterns of the judges en masse should
reflect its impact. As a result, a comparison of the voting patterns of
Reagan/Bush judges as a whole compared to Carter/Clinton judges as a whole
should reflect the difference between textualist and non-textualist judges.
Admittedly, the accuracy of this proxy depends upon the range of
approaches placed under the umbrella of "textualism." Relatively few judges
adhere to the most strict form of textualism, marked by a strident refusal to
employ legislative history and a frequent reliance on dictionary definitions.133
If this strict form is considered the only incarnation of textualism, then there
may be too few textualist judges for the proxy of presidential appointment to
produce meaningful results. The reason this strict form should not be
considered the only form of textualism, however, is that the crucial
characteristic of textutalism in the interpretive model is its claim to allow
131. See, e.g., Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation,
62 U. CoLo. L. REV. 37, 51-52 (1991) (noting the interest in textualism among influential Reagan
appointees to the federal bench); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation,
Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 591 (1991) (same);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1597, 1599 (1991) (same).
132. See generally Stempel, supra note 131, at 590-98.
133. For an example of this approach see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223,
2229-31 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (relying on several dictionary definitions instead of legislative history to
determine that the word "modify" is not ambiguous at step one). Circuit judges that might be considered
strict textualists are Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994) (advocating a textualist mode of statutory interpretation); Alex Kozinski, Hunt
fbr Laws' "True" Meaning Subverts Justice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1989, at A18 (endorsing the use of
"plain meaning" in statutory interpretation).
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judges to extract an unusually high degree of meaning from text.'34 This claim
is not limited to strict textualists; rather, it is a relatively common theme in the
jurisprudence of the Reagan/Bush judiciary." 5 Because Reagan and Bush
judges on the whole claim a commitment to finding statutory meaning in text,
the interpretive model's claims about how "textualists" approach Chevron also
applies more broadly to the mainstream of the Reagan/Bush judiciary. If the
interpretive model is understood to assert that judges who find more meaning
in text apply Chevron differently from those who find less meaning, then a
comparison of the voting patterns of Reagan and Carter judges (to use an
example) should reflect that difference. Therefore, this study adopts a
relatively broad definition of textualism; its focus is the interpretive model's
emphasis on ambiguity-production, not the technicalities of whether a judge
uses dictionaries often or consistently rejects reliance on legislative history.
The test of whether judges from different interpretive schools were more
or less likely than others to apply Chevron was a comparison of the proportion
of applications authored by active circuit judges appointed by a particular
President to the proportion of all active circuit judges appointed by that
President.'36 If textualist judges are less inclined to apply Chevron, then the
proportion of Chevron applications authored by active Reagan and Bush
judges should be lower than their representative proportion of the pool of
active circuit judges. To assess whether textualist and non-textualist judges
deferred at different rates, I compared the overall acceptance rates of Clinton,
Bush, Reagan, Carter, and pre-Carter judges. Similarly, to test the claim that
textualist judges will perceive less or more statutory ambiguity, I compared
the proportions of cases in which judges of each group found that a statute
was ambiguous under Chevron's first step.
III. Study Results
This part presents the quantitative results of the study. It begins with an
overview of the Chevron world, which provides a context for subsequent
findings relating to the three models. This overview includes figures on how
often courts deferred, how often the application was resolved at step one or
134. For the purpose of this analysis, I focus on the interpretive model's claim that textualism
leads to less deference than would be optimal. This position is the majority view among proponents of
the interpretive model. See Maggs, supra note 7, at 393-95.
135. See Lino A. Graglia et al., The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism
and Judicial Mandates, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 107 (1996) (noting that a central claim of judicial
conservatives is that "by engaging in statutory construction that ignores the plain meaning of the
statutes, the courts substitute their own view of what the law should be for what the legislature has
enacted"); Roger Pilon, Rethinking Judicial Restraint, WAt. Sr. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at A 10 (noting that
Reagan and Bush judicial nominees professed their beliefs in literal interpretation of statutory text
during their confirmation hearings). Similar approaches, such as "strict construction," have been rallying
cries for judicial conservatives since at least the Nixon era. See Stempel, supra note 13 1, at 590-98.
136. See supra notes 120-130 (discussing how this information was collected).
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step two, and the Chevron caseload of each circuit. Next, the data on the three
models are presented, beginning with the contextual model, moving to the
political model, and finishing with the interpretive model.
A. Overview of the Chevron World
In the years 1995 and 1996, the U.S. Courts of Appeals applied the
Chevron doctrine in 223 published cases that fit the criteria of this study. In
these 223 cases, the courts applied the doctrine 253 times. The agency
interpretation was accepted in 73% of these applications. 7 The number of
adjudications that were challenged was roughly equal to the number of
regulations that were challenged; both regulations and adjudications were
upheld at essentially the same rate. 31 Overall, 76% of the interpretations were
products of Democratic administrations, the great majority from the Clinton
administration; only 24% were products of Republican administrations, all but
one from the Reagan and Bush administrations. The most common substantive
regulatory areas were the environment, trade and commerce, immigration,
labor, and entitlement benefits. 39 As might be expected, the D.C. Circuit
authored a disproportionate share of Chevron applications: Fully 30% percent
of the applications of the Chevron doctrine originated in the D.C. Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit was responsible for another 15% of the applications. Other
circuits shared smaller portions of the Chevron caseload. The lightest output
was found in the Seventh Circuit, where the doctrine was applied in only six
cases-about 2% of the total. 4°
Courts applying Chevron condensed the two-step test into a single
question of whether the interpretation was "reasonable" in 28% of the
applications.' 4 ' Of those cases, agency views were rejected as unreasonable 16
times and upheld as reasonable 56 times, for an acceptance rate of 78%. When
the courts applied the full two-step framework, they resolved the Chevron
137. One hundred eighty-five interpretations were accepted, and 68 were rejected. A copy of the
data is on file with Yale Journal on Regulation.
138. The 129 adjudications that were challenged were upheld 72% of the time. The 124
regulations that were challenged were upheld at a 74% rate.
139. The substantive breakdown was as follows: 39 applications involved the environment; 39
involved trade and commerce (including tariffs, taxes, and finance); 35 applications concerned
immigration; and 18 applications involved individual entitlement. These subject areas covered about
65% of the total Chevron applications.
140. By circuits, the Chevron caseload was distributed as follows: The D.C. Circuit was
responsible for 77 applications; First Circuit, 7 applications; Second Circuit, 14 applications; Third
Circuit, 17 applications; Fourth Circuit, 17 applications; Fifth Circuit, 12 applications; Sixth Circuit, 9
applications; Seventh Circuit, 6 applications; Eighth Circuit, 9 applications; Ninth Circuit, 37
applications; Tenth Circuit, 14 applications; Eleventh Circuit, 9 applications; Federal Circuit, 25
applications.
141. The equivalence between the full two-step test and a single question of whether the agency
interpretation is "reasonable" is suggested in Byse, supra note 5, at 256; see also Stephen F. Williams,
Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the
Agency, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 113, 123-26 (1990) (statements of Judge Stephen F. Williams).
Vol. 15:1, 1998
Shedding Light on Chevron
question at step one 38% of the time and at step two 62% of the time. When
the analysis was resolved at step one, agency views were upheld 29 times and
rejected 40 times. When the statute was declared ambiguous and the court
moved on to step two, the agency constructions were accepted in 100 cases
and rejected in 12 cases. Thus, courts resolving applications at step one upheld
the agency interpretations only 42% of the time (compared to 73% overall),
and those resolving applications at step two upheld the agency view in 89% of
the applications.
These results are shown in Figure A.
FIGURE A






"Reasonability" Test Two-Step Test Applied
56 Upheld 5
16 Rejected 2 ejected
.(78% Upheld) (71% Upheld)
~~~[Resolved at |~slvda
Step On Step Two/
29 Uheld100 Upheld|
40 Reecte 12 Rejected
(42% Uheld)(89% Upheld)J
B. Results of Testing the Contextual Model
With a general overview of Chevron in place, we now turn to the results
for the contextual model, presented in Charts I through 3. Chart 1 compares
the acceptance rate for consistent interpretations to that for inconsistent
interpretations; Chart 2 explores whether longstanding interpretations receive
greater deference; and Chart 3 examines the relative deference paid to
contemporaneous interpretations.
If the contextual model is accurate, then we would expect that consistent,
longstanding, and contemporaneous interpretations will be upheld more often
than inconsistent, newly enacted, and noncontemporaneous interpretations.'
42
Looking at Charts 1, 2, and 3, the key issue is whether the results reveal a
142. See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 2101 (noting that consistent, contemporaneous, and
longstanding interpretations receive greater deference in the contextual model).
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statistically significant difference among the acceptance rates in each chart, as
only the finding of a significant difference will support rejection of the null
hypothesis that the contextual model is inaccurate and that traditional factors
have no effect on the outcomes.
CHART 1
Consistent and Inconsistent Interpretations
Acceptance Rate for 74% (166/225)
Consistent Interpretations
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CHART 3
Contemporaneous Interpretations
Years Between Passage of Percentage of






Chart 1 reveals that inconsistent interpretations were upheld 68% of the
time, and consistent ones were upheld slightly more often, or 74% of the time.
An independent means t-test for statistical significance reveals that this
difference is insignificant at both the 95% and 90% confidence levels. 144 In
other words, the difference is small enough that we cannot confidently reject
the hypothesis that it is due to chance.
Chart 2 presents data showing the acceptance rate of interpretations as a
function of how long regulation embodying the interpretation has been
binding. It shows that very recent interpretations (a year old or less) are, in
fact, upheld at a lower rate than more longstanding interpretations. However,
there does not appear to be a systematic preference for more longstanding
interpretations: Agency interpretations that were at least a decade old were
accepted at the same rate (72%) as the overall set of regulations (74%)."'
Furthermore, the chi-square test of statistical significance indicates that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the variation in the acceptance rates was due
to chance, even at a mere 75% confidence level.1
46
Turning to the contemporaneous interpretations hypothesis tested in Chart
3, we see that interpretations promulgated within four years of the passage of
a statute are indeed accepted at the higher rate (80%) than those that came
later (68%). Although this difference is not statistically significant at a 95% or
90% confidence level, it is significant at a more forgiving 80% confidence
level. In other words, we can be 80% confident that the higher acceptance rate
144. See generally THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTI, INTRODUCTORY
STAlIsTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMics 265-67 (4th ed. 1990) (explaining the basic theory behind
independent means sampling for statistical significance).
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing overall acceptance rate of
regulations).
146. See generally WONNACOTT & WONNACOir, supra note 144, at 549-55 (explaining the chi-
square test). The chi-square test is a popular non-parametric test for determining statistical significance.
See id
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for more contemporaneous interpretations is not due to random chance. As
Chart 4 and Figure B show, however, the difference shown, by Chart 3 is not
quite as simple when we break down the data further. Final rules that were
adopted in the same year as the statute's passage were actually accepted at a
relatively low rate; that rate increases and reaches its peak at the two-year
mark, and then it begins to drop. Furthermore, when the data is broken down
into the detail of Chart 4 and Figure B, the chi-square test fails to find the
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Confidence?'47
147. X2 = 0.89, d.f. = 5.
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FIGURE B
Contemporaneous Interpretations: Acceptance Rate as a Function of Time
Between Passage of Statute and Publication of Final Rule
95%
65%0
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To summarize, few significant differences were found among the data
produced by tests of the contextual model. Consistent and inconsistent
interpretations were upheld at very similar rates. Although very recent
interpretations were rejected slightly more often than average, there was no
general tendency for older interpretations to be upheld more frequently than
younger ones. Finally, those agency regulations promulgated within four years
of statutory passage were upheld at a slightly higher rate than less
contemporaneous interpretations.
C. Results of Testing the Political Model
1. Structural Claims
The structural claim of the political model asserts that judges will be more
likely to apply the deferential Chevron standard, and then more likely to
accept executive interpretations, if their politics coincide with those of the
administration whose interpretations are reviewed.' Because more than 75%
of the interpretations reviewed in 1995 and 1996 were products of Democratic
administrations, the first part of this claim amounts to a prediction that
Democratic judges are more likely than Republican judges to apply the
Chevron framework. Chart 5 examines this proposition by comparing the
percentage of the applications authored by active judges of each party to the
148. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing structural claim).
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percentage of active circuit judges affiliated with each party at the time of the
study.'49 If the political model is an accurate predictor, then we would expect
the percentage of Chevron applications authored by active Democratic judges
to exceed the percentage of the active circuit court judges appointed by
,Democratic Presidents.
CHART 5
Tendency to Apply Chevron, by Party
Proportion of Weighted Statistically
Party Chevron Proportion of Significant
Affiliation Applications Circuit Court at 95%/90%
Judges Confidence?
Republican 68.2% (137) 66.5% No/No
Democrat 31.8% (64) 33.5% No/No
As Chart 5 shows, the percentage of Chevron applications authored by
active judges of each party matches very closely each party's respective
proportion of the pool of active judges. Democratic judges comprised 33.5%
of the active bench and authored 31.8% of the Chevron applications, even
though most of the executive interpretations reviewed were products of
Democratic administration.
Chart 6 considers the second structural claim of the political model, that
judges applying Chevron will tend to accept interpretations authored by their
own party and to reject those of the opposing party. The chart shows that no
such trend exists: judges of both parties upheld Democratic interpretations at
an identical 71% rate and Republican interpretations at very similar rates
(78% and 73%). These differences were very small given the sample size;
neither of them is statistically significant at either a 95% or 90% confidence
level.
149. The method for calculating the weighted proportion of active judges is discussed in notes
125-127 and accompanying text.
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CHART 6
Tendency to Accept Interpretations by Party
Party of Acceptance Rate, Acceptance Statistically
Executive Republican Rate, Significant at
Branch Judge Democratic 95%/90%
Judge Confidence?
Republican
Executive 78% (32/41) 73% (11/15) No/No
Interpretations
Democratic
Executive 71% (82/115) 71% (48/68) No/No
Interpretations
Thus, neither of the political model's structural claims seems to be
supported by the data. Contrary to expectations, judges aligned with the
politics of the administration under review were no more likely to apply
Chevron, and no more likely to defer when they did, than judges of the
opposite party.
2. Individual Claims
Charts 7 and 8 consider the individual claims of the political model. If the
individual political model correctly describes the Chevron world, then
Republican judges should tend to use Chevron to reach conservative results,
and Democratic judges to reach liberal results. 5 Charts 7 and 8 test this
hypothesis by comparing the acceptance rate between Republican and
Democratic judges in a variety of liberal/conservative contexts.
150. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (discussing individual claims).
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CHART 7
Cases in Which Acceptance Leads to "Conservative" Results
Acceptance Acceptance
Subject Matter Rate, Rate, Statistically Significant
Republican Democratic at 95%/90%
Judge Judge Confidence?
Individual
Entitlement 100% 40% (2/5) Yes/Yes
Benefits (13/13)
Immigration 71% (17/24) 42% (5/12) No/Yes
Appeals
Environment-












Enforcement, 66% (2/3) 0% (0/2) No/No
Prisons, Parole
TOTAL 81% (56/69) 56% (19/34) YES/YES
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CHART 8
Cases in Which Acceptance Leads to "Liberal" Results
Acceptance Acceptance
Subject Matter Rate, Rate, Statistically Significant









Corporate 54% (7/13) 80% (8/10) No/No
Challenge
Environment-
Corporate 78% (7/9) 75% (9/12) No/No
Challenge
Challenges by 67% (2/3) 100% (2/2) No/No
States
TOTAL 66% (35/53) 84% (31/37) NO/YES
These data reveal that, indeed, there is a tendency for Republican and
Democratic judges to reach results consistent with their political ideologies in
certain areas. For example, Chart 7 shows that when individuals appealed
denials of entitlement benefits, Republican judges upheld the decision to deny
benefits 100% of the time (thirteen out of thirteen cases). By contrast,
Democratic judges upheld the government's denial only 40% of the time (two
out of five cases). Similarly, individual immigration appeals were received
very differently by Republican and Democratic judges. Republican judges
sided with the government against the individual 71% of the time, while
Democratic judges did so only 42% of the time. These results were
statistically significant, the former at a 95% confidence level, the latter at a
90% level. Chart 8 shows that this trend continued when deferral to the
executive branch would further liberal policies. For example, economic
regulations dealing with commerce, trade, and taxes were upheld significantly
more often by Democratic judges than by Republican judges-92% versus
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68%.' Overall, looking at the total difference between Democratic and
Republican judges in cases with relatively clear ideological significance, there
is a gap of about 20% between the acceptance rates of the two groups.52
D. Results of Testing the Interpretive Model
The interpretive model makes three central claims: That textualist judges
will be less likely to apply Chevron than judges who approach text more
loosely; that the two groups of judges will find statutory text to be ambiguous
at significantly different rates; and that the two groups will uphold
interpretations at significantly different rates.'53 The results of testing these
three hypotheses are presented, respectively, in Charts 9, 10, and 11.
Chart 9 considers whether judges appointed by particular Presidents are
more or less likely than others to apply Chevron.'54 Because textualist and
strict constructionist approaches are closely linked with Reagan and Bush
judges, the interpretive model predicts that Reagan and Bush judges will
author fewer Chevron opinions relative to their number than will Carter and
Clinton judges.' Chart 9 compares the proportion of the applications
authored by active judges appointed by each President to the weighted
proportion of all active judges appointed by that President.
151. In some areas, such as law enforcement (Chart 7), and challenges by states (Chart 8),
differences did exist but were not statistically significant due to small sample sizes.
152. See the last lines of Charts 7 and 8. It should be noted that Charts 7 and 8 include 193
applications, more than 75% of the applications in the study. The remaining 25% covered substantive
areas such as energy and communications, in which there was no clear ideological significance. The
acceptance rates among Republican and Democratic judges were essentially identical in these other
areas.
153. See supra Section I.C. (discussing interpretive model).
154. This table is a close cousin of Chart 5; it presents by President what Chart 5 presented by
party. The extra detail is needed in Chart 9 because not all Republican administrations have been equally
supportive of textualism, and not all Democratic executives have been equally opposed to it. In
particular, Reagan and Bush judges are generally believed to be most attracted to textualism, while
Carter judges, as the most liberal set of Democratic judges, are believed to be most repelled by it. See
supra notes 131-133, 135 and accompanying text. Cf Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of
President Clinton's Judicial Appointments, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 20 (1996) (comparing the voting patterns
of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton judges and finding that Carter judges vote for the
liberal position significantly more often than do Clinton judges).
155. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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CHART 9
Tendency to Apply Chevron, by Presidential Appointment
Appointing Proportion of Chevron Weighted Proportion of
President Applications Circuit Court Judges
Clinton 17.9% (36) 17.3%
Bush 19.9% (40) 23.5%
Reagan 44.8% (90) 39.7%




Statistically Significant at 75% Confidence?"s  No
Chart 9 fails to support the claim that textualist judges will be less likely
than others to apply the two-step test. The data show that Reagan judges are
slightly more likely to apply Chevron than their numbers would suggest, while
Bush and Carter judges are slightly less likely. Furthermore, these differences
are very small and fail even a 75% confidence level chi-square test for
statistical significance. In other words, the data fail to reject the hypothesis
that appointees of all Presidents are equally likely to apply Chevron,
regardless of their interpretive approaches.
The data in Chart 10 consider whether judges appointed by particular
administrations found significantly more or less ambiguity than other judges.
According to the interpretive model, judges who have adopted interpretive
approaches that tend to find meaning in text will perceive less statutory
ambiguity at step one, and therefore reach Chevron's step two less frequently
than other judges.' Most proponents of the interpretive model believe that
textualist-influenced judges see more meaning in text, and should see less
ambiguity; a minority believe that they will find less meaning, and thus more
ambiguity.' Chart 10 evaluates both hypotheses by comparing the
percentages of applications that reached step two authored by judges
appointed by different Presidents, which corresponds roughly to different
interpretive philosophies.
156. X2 = 7.2, d.f. = 6.
157. See supra Section I.C. (discussing interpretive model).
158. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
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CHART 10
Tendency to Find Ambiguity, by Presidential Appointment
Appointing President Percent of Cases in Which Ambiguity Was










at 75% Confidence? 59
Chart 10 reveals no clear correlation among presidential appointments and
the rates at which judges found ambiguity under Chevron's step one. Overall,
Republican and Democratic judges found ambiguity at almost exactly the
same rate. Notably, Carter judges found the least ambiguity; they resolved the
Chevron analysis at step two only 55% of the time. Clinton judges found the
most ambiguity, reaching step two 70% of the time. Reagan and Bush judges
were sandwiched between Carter and Clinton judges, finding ambiguity in
63% and 59% of the cases, respectively. These differences were small,
however, failing to achieve statistical significance.
Chart 11 compares overall acceptance rates by Presidential appointment.
The interpretive model predicts that Reagan and Bush judges, being more
inclined to be textualists, will have acceptance rates different from Carter and
Clinton judges. 6 ° As Chart 11 illustrates, however, there is a remarkably
uniform acceptance rate among judges.
159. X2 = 0.7, d.f. = 5.
160. See supra Section I.C. (discussing interpretive model).
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CHART 11
Overall Acceptance, by Presidential Appointment









Statistically Significant at No
75% Confidence? 6'
With the exception of Bush appointees, appointees of every President
since Nixon accepted agency interpretations at a rate between 69% and 71%,
inclusive. Bush appointees accepted agency interpretations at a slightly higher
rate (82%), but this difference is not statistically significant.
Chart 11 confirms the result suggested by Charts 9 and 10. In all three,
there is no clear relationship between the interpretive philosophy embraced by
a set of judges and their approach to Chevron. All sets of judges were roughly
as likely to apply Chevron, perceived the same degree of ambiguity, and were
roughly as likely to accept agency interpretations. In short, the trends
predicted by the interpretive model have not been found by this study.
IV. Analysis: Do the Three Models Describe Chevron Accurately?
This part examines how the results either support or contradict the
predictions of the contextual, political, and interpretive models of Chevron.
For each model, three issues are considered. The first issue is how well the
model predicts patterns of judicial decisionmaking. Second, to the extent that
the model does describe the patterns, I consider whether the patterns can also
be explained by alternative theories. Third, to the extent that the model fails to
161. X2 = 0.7688, d.f. = 5.
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describe the patterns accurately, I examine possible misunderstandings that
might have led proponents of the model to adopt a mistaken view of how
judges apply the doctrine.
A. Analysis of the Contextual Model
The data suggest that the contextual model is a poor predictor of judicial
behavior under Chevron. Contrary to the predictions of the contextual model,
inconsistently held interpretations were accepted at essentially the same rate
as those that were consistent over time.162 Although freshly enacted
regulations were invalidated unusually often, there was no systematic
preference in favor of upholding regulations that were longstanding:
regulations that had been in effect for a decade or more were upheld at the
same rate as newer ones, and the regulations that were upheld most often were
those that had been enacted only two to four years prior to judicial resolution
in the courts of appeals.'63 These results indicate that, at best, the traditional
factors exert a weak influence on Chevron outcomes.
The likelihood that the traditional factors continue to influence post-
Chevron courts appears strongest when we consider the acceptance of
contemporaneous interpretations. Executive interpretations that appeared in
final rules within four years of a statute's passage were upheld at a higher rate
(80%) than those that appeared later (68%).164 Although the difference is
significant only at an 80% confidence level, the difference is precisely what
the contemporaneous adoption factor would predict-that courts should defer
more frequently to interpretations that followed soon after a statute was
passed.
Does this mean that the contemporaneous-interpretation traditional factor
is still vital? Not necessarily. Courts might accept nearly contemporaneous
interpretations more frequently than later ones because contemporaneous
interpretations actually reflect statutory text more accurately. That is, it is
162. Although a six percent difference exists, it is statistically insignificant and likely the result
of chance. See supra p. 32 cht.1. Further, because the test itself was biased in favor of finding a
difference, the absence of a larger difference in acceptance rates suggests that we can be fairly confident
that consistency does not impact Chevron deference. See supra note 119.
163. See supra p. 32 cht.2. The fact that regulations that were promulgated less than a year prior
to judicial resolution were invalidated unusually frequently cannot convincingly be explained by the
traditional preference for longstanding interpretations, because this preference generally refers to
interpretations that have existed for decades. See, e.g., Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 667-68
(1980) (recognizing increased deference for interpretation that had been in effect for several decades).
Perhaps it can be explained by judicial willingness to invalidate a rule with regards to which few
reliance interests have developed, and which may never have been put into effect. Alternatively, the high
invalidation rate for very young regulations may be explained by the Clinton administration's
promulgation of several weak regulations during 1994 and 1995. For example, several amendments to
the Clean Air Act were not received well by the courts. See, e.g., Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. v.
EPA, 101 F.3d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (invalidating emissions standards regulation); American
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (invalidating reformulated gasoline regulations).
164. See supra p. 33 cht.3.
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unclear whether the higher acceptance rates are due to the courts' sense that
contemporaneous interpretations better reflect congressional intent (a
traditional explanation of the contemporaneous factor)'65 or, alternatively, the
reality that they do. If the former is true, then the traditional factor is still vital;
if not, then the theory inspiring the traditional factor is validated, but the factor
itself is dead.
There are two reasons to think that the latter understanding better explains
the slightly higher acceptance rate of contemporaneous interpretations. First,
the failure of most judicial opinions to report the dates of both statutory
passage and the appearance of the final rule suggests that many courts were
unconcerned or even unaware of whether the interpretations at issue were
contemporaneous.'66 If judges paid attention to the timing of final rules and
used that timing either to relax or ratchet-up standards of deference, as the
contextual model predicts, we would expect that these dates would usually be
noted in judicial opinions.
A second reason to accept the latter theory is the possibility that it can
explain the peculiar shape of the curve in Figure B. As Figure B shows, truly
contemporaneous interpretations-those promulgated less than two years after
the passage of a statute-are actually accepted at a relatively low rate. The
rate climbs as time passes, reaches a peak at two years after the statute was
passed, and then declines. Although these patterns could be attributable to
chance fluctuations,'67 they might also be explained by a functional
understanding of agency behavior. Perhaps final rules promulgated within
months of the passage of a statute are less faithful interpretations of statutory
text because they are products of hurried efforts to publish a rule as soon as
possible. By comparison, rules promulgated two years after the statute was
passed might be expected to be more careful and faithful products of notice
and comment procedures. Finally, regulations promulgated many years later
could be the product of an agency's attempts to do more with the statute than
its text and original purpose might allow, as the contemporaneous
interpretation theory suggests. The result would be a pattern of acceptance
rates resembling the curve of Figure B.
Ultimately, it is unclear whether the results in Chart 3 are products of the
contextual model's influence, the reality of how well agencies interpret
statutes at different times, or chance fluctuations. In any event, the data
suggest that, at best, the contextual model exerts only a very weak influence
on the outcomes of applications of Chevron.
Although the data suggest that traditional factors have not retained their
significance in the Chevron era, two important limitations must be taken into
165. See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 2102.
166. 1 would estimate that both dates were included in about 30% of the applications I analyzed.
167. Recall that a chi-square test of significance found that the results of Figure B could not
reject (even at a 75% confidence level) the hypothesis that the fluctuations were due to chance.
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account. First, traditional factors appear to remain important to particular
judges, who continue to discuss them in their published opinions.68 If judges
assigned to a particular appellate panel believe that the traditional factors are
still relevant, then, a priori, they are. Of course, judicial citation alone does
not necessarily connote importance; it is possible that judges only discuss
traditional factors when the factors support the conclusion that they would
otherwise reach. 6 9 In any event, discussions of traditional factors were limited
to about 5% of the cases studied.
The second limitation on the conclusion that the contextual model is a
poor predictor of post-Chevron deference is the fact that this study examined
only three factors that were themselves interrelated. 7 It is possible that some
untested factors remain strong predictors of deference, so that the contextual
model remains viable in some areas, but not in others. It would be odd if
Chevron wiped out some factors while leaving others in place, but it would
not be inexplicable. Commentators have noted that the functional rationale for
deferring more often to consistent, contemporaneous, and longstanding
interpretations has never been entirely clear. 7' It is possible that these
traditional factors have been preempted by Chevron whereas other, more
functional factors have survived. For example, courts might ignore whether
interpretations were longstanding, consistent, and contemporaneous, but
nonetheless defer at a higher rate to interpretations involving scientific or
technical questions in tacit recognition of agency expertise. 7 '
Despite these two limitations, this study's results reject the stronger
claims of the contextual model, that the traditional factors are alive and well in
the Chevron era. The traditional factors may impact some cases in small ways,
168. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1007 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cyr, J.)
(asserting that longstanding interpretations receive more deference); Credit Union Ins. Corp. v. United
States, 86 F.3d 1326, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (Russell, J.) (arguing that inconsistent interpretations receive
less deference than consistent interpretations); Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Hamilton, J.) (same); Sarasota Mem'l Hosp. v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1507, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1995) (Dubina,
J.) (maintaining that interpretations involving agency expertise receive more deference); Florida Mfrd.
Hous. Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1573 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (Cares, J.) (arguing that inconsistent
interpretations receive less deference than consistent interpretations); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44
F.3d 1441, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1995) (Hall, J.) (claiming that congressional acquiescence validates earlier
agency interpretation).
169. If this is the case, then the traditional factors may be cited even though they are not actually
influencing judicial outcomes. Compare Florida Mfrd. Hous. Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1574
(1 th Cir. 1995) (rejecting inconsistent interpretation (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
n.30 (1987) for the proposition that inconsistent interpretations receive less deference)), with
Massachusetts v. FDIC, 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding inconsistent interpretation (citing
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) for the position that inconsistent interpretations do not
receive less deference)).
170. The factors are related in that they all concern the timing of the administrative
interpretation, as compared to the substance of the regulation or the agency involved.
171. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 63, at 2101-02.
172. Note, however, that it is difficult to distinguish between interpretations that involve
technical and scientific questions and those that do not, making measurement difficult. See supra
Subsection II.A.1.
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but the assertion that Chevron is a "revolution on paper"'73 that has left the
traditional factor regime completely intact seems difficult to maintain. The
traditional factors may once have governed judicial review of agency action,
but the evidence suggests that, at the court of appeals level, they have been
largely eclipsed by Chevron.
The contextual model's apparent failure to predict accurately post-
Chevron results prompts the question: Where have followers of the contextual
model erred? One possibility is the contextualists' misunderstanding of how
often courts reject agency interpretations. Recall that the contextualists' faith
in the traditional factors typically is inspired by an understanding that taking
the two-step model seriously would shift powers dramatically to the agencies
and lead to an abdication of the proper judicial function.' 74 This concern
follows from an understanding that the Chevron test nearly always will force
courts to accede to agency interpretations: Most statutes will be ambiguous,
and nearly all ambiguous statutes will be upheld. As a result, the test is seen as
a "blank check" to the agencies which must be tempered by the traditional
factors regime.
The fear that Chevron is a blank check appears to be unjustified, however.
As Figure A illustrates, fully 38% of the applications of Chevron were
resolved at step one, and 58% of these resolved applications were decided
against the agency. Even when the courts acknowledged statutory ambiguity
and moved on to the second step, the agency's interpretation was still rejected
11% of the time. Furthermore, when the court collapsed the Chevron doctrine
into a single test of reasonableness, the court rejected the agency view as
"unreasonable" 22% of the time.
Judicial willingness to declare text unambiguous, and even to invalidate
interpretations of admittedly ambiguous statutes, suggests that Chevron is
probably not the blank check that many contextualists have feared it to be.
Even at step two, judges have refused to abdicate their task of reviewing
agency action. Granted, some may question whether this willingness to reject
agency positions reflects a true reading of the language of Chevron. Perhaps
judges have adopted readings of "ambiguous" and "reasonable" that are more
or less strict than the two-step's text or history would support in order to attain
the rough degree of deference that most judges deem proper. Regardless, the
unexpected and previously unmeasured "bite" of both the first and second
steps explains how the traditional factors could be eclipsed to a large extent.
Judicial standards of what is "ambiguous" at step one and "reasonable" at step
two have been set at levels that rein in agencies reasonably effectively.
Perhaps the traditional factors are not needed to temper Chevron, because
judges have interpreted Chevron such that it tempers itself.
173. Merrill, supra, note 5, at 971.
174. See generally supra notes 28-30. '
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B. Analysis of the Political Model
The political model predicts Chevron outcomes with only mixed success.
The model's structural claims, which predict that the strength of a judge's
inclination to apply and defer under Chevron depends on how much the judge
agrees with the politics of the administration reviewed, appear to be incorrect.
However, the study generally validates the individual claim-namely, that
judges will sometimes vote with their politics in individual cases. This finding
is made with the caveat that the tendency appears to be no more pronounced
in the Chevron era than under the traditional factors regime.
1. Structural Claims
The results of the study fail to support the structural claims of the political
model. Democratic judges were not more likely to apply Chevron than
Republican judges, even though Democratic judges were presumably more "in
tune" with the politics of the Democratic administrations the courts spent most
of their time reviewing. Furthermore, when judges did apply the two-step
Chevron test, they did not agree with the interpretations of like-minded
administrations more frequently than with those of the opposing party. These
results suggest that judges do not use Chevron as a weapon to support the
administrative efforts of political allies and to undermine those of political
enemies. Judges who are politically aligned with a particular administration do
not go out of their way to invoke Chevron in an effort to make sure that its
administrative judgments are upheld, and they are no more likely to accept the
interpretations of agencies controlled by political allies than those controlled
by enemies."'7
The likely error made by proponents of the structural claims of the
political model is acceptance of an oversimplified view of agency output.
Proponents generally assume that Democratic and Republican administrations
produce systematically "liberal" and "conservative" interpretations,
respectively. This is misleading. Although Republican agencies may in
general produce new interpretations that are more conservative than those of
Democratic agencies, executive interpretations are almost always the products
of some ideological compromise. 7 6 As a result, Democratic executive
interpretations will often be challenged by groups seeking more liberal results,
and GOP executive constructions will be challenged by parties desiring more
175. This conclusion is supported by a recent empirical study of Supreme Court review of
agency action. See John C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Supreme Court Review of Federal
Administrative Agencies, 80 JUDICATURE 130, 135 (1996) ("Apparently party control of political
institutions does not have a significant influence on the Court's support of agencies. The Court seems to
be at best only slightly affected by the partisan context of national politics when it decides agency
cases.").
176. See generally O'REILLY, supra note 118, at 62.
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conservative results. Furthermore, parties often challenge agency actions that
resist ideological categorization, such as the details of tariff calculation.
77
Given the full panoply of agency action, it is wrong to assume that accepting
the interpretations of Republican executives will further conservative views,
and that upholding Democratic executive constructions furthers liberal
policies. The correlation between the politics of an administration and the
consequences of upholding its interpretations is too tenuous to allow political
judges to approach Chevron differently when reviewing the interpretations of
different administrations.
2. Individual Claims
In contrast with the structural claims of the political model, the individual
claim accurately predicted voting trends in several types of cases. Just as the
political model asserts, judges who applied Chevron in cases with clear
political ramifications tended to reach results consistent with their political
views. The acceptance rate among Democratic and Republican judges in these
cases differed by about 20%, with Democratic judges more likely to author
opinions reaching liberal results and Republican judges more likely to author
opinions reaching conservative results.
7 1
Admittedly, these differences are somewhat smaller than the numbers
suggest due to judicial self-selection. Self-selection may occur when the
presiding judge on an appellate panel assigns opinions among the judges on
the panel: Judges will tend to be more attracted to authoring opinions aligned
with their political philosophy than to authoring those that oppose it. For
example, imagine that a panel of two Carter appointees and one Reagan
appointee decides an immigration case, and that all three judges agree on the
merits that the government reasonably interpreted the law in denying asylum
177. See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 77 F.3d 426 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (challenging
the methodology of how an agency calculated the fair market value of products to arrive at the proper
tariff); see also Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certainty on Appeal, 44
DUKE L.J. 1081, 1084 (1995) ("[M]any cases do not involve such high stakes and public passions. In
those cases, it is much easier to believe that judges are honestly willing to be guided by [doctrine].").
178. See supra pp. 38-39 chts.7-8. This difference is particularly dramatic in certain areas. In
Chart 7, for example, we see that Republican judges affirmed the government's decision to deny
entitlement benefits 13 out of 13 times, whereas Democratic judges affirmed such decisions only two out
of five times. Similarly, in Chart 8, Democratic judges upheld government economic regulations at a
92% rate, whereas Republican judges upheld the economic regulations at a 68% rate. In both cases,
Republican judges were more likely to reach results that furthered the agenda of the Republican party,
and Democratic judges were more likely to reach results that furthered the Democratic party's agenda.
The executive interpretations examined in Charts 7 and 8 represent 193 out of the 239 Chevron
applications that were identifiable as having been authored by a judge of a particular party. (Although
there were 253 Chevron applications, the authorship of 14 applications could not be identified by party
because they appeared in per curiam opinions authored by a panel of both Republican and Democratic
judges.) The remainder of the applications were primarily in the energy, communications, and
transportation fields, in which there were no obvious ideological stakes and no difference in the
acceptance rates between Democratic and Republican judges.
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to the appellant. If judges are attracted to writing opinions that are roughly
aligned with their political leanings, we would expect that the Reagan
appointee would be more likely than either other judge to author the opinion.
.If this dynamic is repeated, then liberal judges will tend to author more liberal
opinions, and conservative judges will tend to author more conservative
opinions, even if judges of both parties are in complete agreement with each
other on the merits of every case.
The existence of a self-selection problem was confirmed by studying the
panels involved in deciding each case in two particularly divergent areas:
immigration and individual entitlement benefits. In particular, I was interested
in unanimous panels comprised of both Republican and Democratic
appointees. If there is a self-selection problem, then the minority party judge
will be less than 33% likely to author the opinion if the opinion resonates with
the politics of the majority party, and more than 33% likely to author the
opinion if it instead aligns with the agenda of the minority party.'79 In fact, this
is exactly what happened. When the outcome was aligned with the politics of
the majority party, the minority judge authored only 13% of the opinions (2
out of 15); when it was aligned with the politics of the minority party, the
minority judge authored 46% of the opinions (6 out of 13). The presence of
self-selection means that the different rates in Charts 7 and 8 overstate the
actual impact of political differences on the outcomes of Chevron cases. Part
of the difference is due to judges reaching Chevron outcomes that are
consistent with their politics, but part of it is due to the judges' eagerness to
write opinions when their legal conclusions happen to match their political
preferences.
Even acknowledging the self-selection problem, there are two ways to
interpret the divergent voting patterns of liberal and conservative judges in
politically charged subject areas. On an absolute level, it is clear that judges
applying Chevron are sometimes influenced by the political stakes of the
litigation. The more interesting question, however, is the relative one:
Accepting the realist insight that politics can influence outcomes, how does
the impact of politics in the Chevron world compare to its importance outside
of Chevron? This is the true test of the political model-whether the Chevron
framework reduces or expands the discretion of those judges who may be
inclined to use judicial review as an opportunity to enact their personal policy
preferences into law. 8°
179. Because the cases were heard before a three-judge panel, each case was heard either by two
GOP appointees and a Democratic appointee, or vice-versa. Two judges can be termed majority party
judges on such a panel; the third is the minority party judge. The 33% figure represents the random
likelihood that any one of the three judges would be assigned authorship of the opinion in each case.
180. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 6, at 1070 (arguing that the tools of statutory interpretation
upon which Chevron hinges are "inherently imprecise," freeing judges to reach outcomes that they
prefer); Vaughns, supra note 6, at 149-50 (arguing that the Chevron two-step test is "elastic enough to
permit a judge to build what she will out of the language").
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Comparing the results of this study with those of an earlier study by
Professor Jon Gottschall suggests, albeit tentatively, that Chevron has neither
significantly increased nor significantly decreased the degree of outcome-
orientation that existed during the pre-Chevron era. Professor Gottschall
analyzed the voting records of Republican-appointed and Democrat-appointed
circuit judges starting just over a year before Chevron was decided. 8 '
Although there is some overlap between the period of Professor Gottschall's
study and the beginning of the Chevron era,'82 the impact of Chevron on
Gottschall's results is negligible.'83 Therefore, we can use his study to draw a
rough comparison between how judges voted in the traditional factors era and
how they vote in the Chevron era.
Gottschall analyzed the voting patterns of Republican and Democratic
appointees in two areas that are similar to those used in this study: labor and
welfare.'84 Instead of examining opinion authorship, Gottschall tallied the
votes of all judges on each panel, assigning to each vote a liberal or
conservative orientation.'85 Because this approach corrects for any self-
selection that may overstate the degree of political difference between the two
sets of judges, small differences in the voting patterns between Republican
and Democratic judges observed by Gottschall should correspond to larger
differences in our own study. Examining labor cases, Gottschall found a 20%
gap between how often Republican and Democratic judges voted for liberal
outcomes.186 By way of contrast, in this study's category of health, safety, and
labor cases, there was a gap of about 25% between the rates at which
Republican and Democratic judges authored such opinions.'87 In the welfare
area, Gottschall found an 8% difference between GOP and Democrat
appointees' votes.' 88 In my own study, the 18 welfare cases yielded a large gap
181. See Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The
Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUOICATURE 48, 51 (1986).
182. Chevron was handed down on July 25, 1984. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Gottschall's study analyzed cases from July 1, 1983 to
December 31, 1984. See Gottshcall, supra note 181, at 51.
183. A Westlaw search in the court of appeals database in the year 1984 reveals that Chevron
was cited in only seven majority opinions by the courts of appeals during the five month period of
overlap. Search of Westlaw, CTA Database (Dec. 11, 1997). Because Gottschall's study encompasses
almost four thousand cases, see Gottschall, supra note 181, at 51, the effect of Chevron was
insignificant.
184. See Gottschall, supra note 181, at 51.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 54 tbl.6. Overall, Republican judges voted for the liberal result about 50% of the
time, and Democratic judges about 69% of the time. To reach these figures, I have taken the liberty of
combining Gottschall's results for the Kennedy/Johnson and Carter judges to arrive at the 69% figure for
Democratic appointees and the Nixon/Ford and Reagan judges to arrive at the 50% figure for GOP
appointees.
187. See supra p. 39 cht.8.
188. See Gottschall, supra note 181, at 54 tbl.6. Again, I have taken the liberty of combining
Gottschall's results for Kennedy/Johnson and Carter appointees to arrive at a Democratic figure, and
those for Nixon/Ford and Reagan appointees to arrive at an overall Republican figure.
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of 60%.' Combining all the categories Gottschall studied, he found a gap of
about 10 or 20%;19' the last lines of Charts 7 and 8 reveal an overall gap in
this study of about 20 or 25%.
Comparisons between the two studies are complicated by different
methodologies and time periods and the relatively small number of cases I
studied. Most glaringly, Gottschall's study is not limited to judicial review of
agency interpretations of statutory law, which makes a direct comparison
between the Chevron regime and the traditional factors regime difficult.'9 '
Despite this caveat, one can draw the very tentative conclusion that, overall,
Chevron has probably not dramatically altered the pre-Chevron level of
judicial outcome-orientation in politically charged cases. Keeping in mind the
self-selection biases, it appears that Chevron has reduced the zone of
discretion in the labor area. However, it apparently has expanded the zone in
the welfare area, although probably not as profoundly as one might infer from
the 60% difference, which was likely due in large part to the extremely small
sample size.
192
Looking at the aggregate data, the difference between the overall gap
shown by Gottschall and that in this study appears well within the order of
bias caused by self-selection. At the very least, the comparison fails to support
the conclusion that Chevron outcomes are unusually indeterminate in a way
that frees judges to pursue politically desirable outcomes more than they may
under other legal regimes. Although more evidence would have to be
collected before a more definite conclusion could be reached, this admittedly
rough comparison fails to support the view that the Chevron regime is either
dramatically more or less determinate than the traditional factors regime.'93
189. See supra p. 38 cht.7.
190. See Gottschall, supra note 181, at 54 tbl.6.
191. However, appeals in the welfare and labor areas will be almost entirely reviews of agency
action, making the comparison between Gottschall's numbers and my own at least plausible.
192. The 40% acceptance rate for Democratic judges was based on only 5 cases; the 100% rate
for Republican judges was based on 13 cases.
193. A review of the literature on pre-Chevron judicial review of agency interpretations of law
suggests that Chevron's failure to be less determinate than the traditional factor test should not be
altogether surprising. Before Chevron was decided, there was a fairly broad scholarly consensus that
judicial review doctrine was chaotic and unpredictable, if not nonexistent. See Stephen M. Lynch, Note,
A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469. It was generally understood that the Supreme
Court had developed two independent lines of authority on the issue of whether a reviewing court should
defer to agency interpretations of law: One line of cases granted deference to agency interpretations, and
the other did not. It was also understood that there was little or no way to determine when the Court
would choose one line of cases over the other. See, e.g., 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 30.07 (1958) (noting that the Court had never attempted to explain why it applied a given
line of cases); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 239, 258-62 (1955)
(identifying the two lines of cases); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
CoLUM. L. Ruv. 1, 4 (1983) (terming the case law "apparently erratic"). Thus, what today is sometimes
considered the elegant "traditional factors regime" was then considered essentially unpredictable and
result-oriented. However indeterminate the Chevron doctrine may be, it is difficult to see how it could be
less determinate than the doctrinal vacuum it replaced. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its
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C. Analysis of the Interpretive Model
The most conclusive results produced by this study relate to the
interpretive model. The data uniformly fail to support the model's claims,
finding no correlation between a judge's interpretive method and his or her
approach to Chevron. This unexpected result suggests the need for a
reexamination of the connection between Chevron and textualism in order to
gain a better understanding of both.
The results directly contradict the most common and important claim
made by followers of the interpretive model, which is that textualist judges
will find a different level of ambiguity at step one than will nontextualist
judges.'94 In fact, judges whom we know to be particularly influenced by
textualism were no more likely than other judges to find that a statute had a
plain meaning at step one.'95 The data also fail to support the related assertions
that textualist judges will either interfere with agency actions improperly or be
too deferential. For example, the overall rate at which textualism-influenced
Reagan judges upheld agency interpretations of law was nearly identical to the
rate at which Carter judges did SO.196 Finally, the data contradict Professor
Merrill's claim that textualist judges will be less Chevron-prone than non-
textualist judges by demonstrating no correlation between a given group's
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. Ri v. 301,
313 (1988) (concluding that under Chevron, "judges will have less room to infuse their personal political
philosophies in the Nation's policy making process").
194. See supra note 7 for articles that rely on the interpretive model.
195. Chart 10 on page 41 shows no correlation between a judge's interpretive philosophy and his
or her tendency to find ambiguity. Clinton and Carter judges found the most and the least amount of
ambiguity, respectively; Bush and Reagan judges were in the middle. These differences were slight,
statistically insignificant, and almost certainly explained by chance, suggesting that the judges in each
group were equally prone to find ambiguity in statutory text.
196. See supra p. 43 cht. 11. The acceptance rate among all judges was remarkably uniform, with
the vast majority between 69% and 71%. See id
There are several potential explanations for the higher acceptance rate (82%) of Bush judges. One
explanation is that Bush judges took the bench at a time when Chevron was well-established, Congress
was and had been Democratic for some time, and the presidency had been held by Republicans since
1980. Looking back at the structural claims of the political model, one could imagine that judges trained
in this atmosphere would associate deference with helping the administration that appointed them. These
judges thus would have been "trained" to accept agency interpretations. This explanation is undercut by
the apparent inability of the structural claims of the political model to predict patterns of Chevron cases
accurately.
A second and related explanation is the Bush administration's public search for judicial candidates
who favored judicial restraint. See, e.g., Nadine Cohodas, Bush on Judiciary: The Signals Are Mixed,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Nov. 26, 1988, at 3394 (discussing the Bush administration's focus on judicial
restraint). Because a judge might see rejection of an administrative interpretation as "activism," it is
possible that Bush judges deferred more often because they were restraint-oriented.
However, the fact that Reagan judges did not share the high acceptance rate of Bush judges
suggests that the unusually high acceptance rate among Bush judges is best explained by chance. See
Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294, 306
(1991) (arguing that Bush judges share the jurisprudential moorings of Reagan judges). In any event, it
is important to note that despite the higher acceptance rate among Bush appointees, Bush judges found
statutes to be ambiguous a tad less often than average (59% as compared to 62%).
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opinion of textualism and its tendency to apply Chevron.'97 Judges from
different interpretive schools appear equally likely to apply Chevron's two-
step framework, equally likely to find that a statute is ambiguous at step one,
and equally likely to uphold agency interpretations of law.
Because textualism is almost uniquely associated with Reagan and Bush
appointees,' the fact that the.Reagan/Bush judiciary in the courts of appeals
applied Chevron, found ambiguity, and deferred to agency interpretations at
the same rate as other judges directly challenges the validity of the interpretive
model. Textualism may or may not lead judges to defer in the correct set of
cases (assuming there is such a set), but it seems fairly clear that, at least in the
Chevron context in the courts of appeals, the textualism associated with
Reagan and Bush judges has not introduced "cacophony and incoherence
throughout the administrative state." '199
Proponents of the interpretive model might make two responses to my
conclusion that the interpretive model is inaccurate, both of which present
alternative visions of what it means to be a textualist. The first response
questions the accuracy of the fit between presidential appointment and a
judge's interpretive school, The argument is as follows: If we adopt a stricter
notion of what it means to be a textualist, then we find that there are really
only a handful of textualist circuit judges, such as Frank Easterbrook °° and
Alex Kozinski.2°' Even if all of those textualist judges are Reagan and Bush
appointees, their numbers are too small to affect the overall acceptance rates
of the 105 active Reagan and Bush judges included in the study. Therefore,
this study shows only that mainstream Reagan and Bush judges are not
textualists-not that textualists do not defer differently from non-textualists.
This argument falters primarily because it fails to* account for the
centrality of the textualist orientation to the brand of conservative legal
thought embraced by mainstream Reagan and Bush appointees. The judicial
orientation of the Reagan and Bush administrations was defined by its
opposition to the broad use of non-textual sources in constitutional and
statutory interpretation; a central theme of the legal writings of the
proponents of these administrations is that meaning can be found in text,
whether the text is statutory or constitutional.2 2 From this perspective, the law
197. Reagan judges and Clinton judges applied Chevron slightly more frequently than their
numbers would predict; Bush and Carter judges applied it slightly less frequently. See supra p. 41 cht.9.
These differences were small and almost certainly due to chance.
198. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
199. Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at 752. Note that this result is consistent with those
flound by Professor Maggs. See Maggs, supra note 7, at 416-17.
200. See Easterbrook, supra note 133 (advocating a textualist mode of statutory interpretation).
201. See Kozinski, supra note 133 (endorsing the use of "plain meaning" in statutory
interpretation).
202. See, e.g., CIIARLrS FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING TriE REAGAN REVOLUIION-A
FIRS'IIAND AccoUNT 61-65 (1991) (noting that interest in originalism among legal conservatives in the
Reagan era was fueled by originalism's promise to find definiteness in text); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
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is found in the text, and a judge who looks beyond the text for meaning is an
activist, because the judge is no longer interpreting the law but making it.203
Given the centralized screening process employed by the Reagan and Bush
administrations to ensure that all judicial selections shared their judicial
philosophy," 4 it is unlikely that many Reagan or Bush appointees would
fundamentally disagree with this viewpoint.2"5 Indeed, contemporary reports
of the confirmation proceedings of Reagan and Bush judges noted that "literal
interpretation of statutory . . . texts" was among the "bedrock conservative
doctrine[s]" articulated by the nominees.20 6
Although this does not mean that all Reagan and Bush circuit judges are
textualists in the mold of Justice Scalia, it does mean that Justice Scalia's
textualism is one particular instantiation of a belief in text that is shared by
most Reagan and Bush circuit judges.20 7 If the interpretive model is correct in
positing that judges who profess to find meaning in text will find ambiguity
less frequently at Chevron's step one, then Reagan and Bush judges should
USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A REEVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989); E. Spencer Abraham, Introduction: Twentieth Anniversary Volume,
20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1996) ("If we are to confine courts to their proper role,... [we] must
revive the notion that there are intelligible legal principles that courts can follow, distinct from the
judge's will."); Richard A. Epstein, Some Doubts on Constitutional Indeterminacy, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y. 363, 365 (1996) (suggesting that indeterminacy is often used as a ploy "to avoid . . .
embarrassing silence" when a judge or advocate "ha[s] nothing to say on the merits" as to why a certain
result is legally correct); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 71, 77 (1994) (D.C. circuit judge appointed by Bush notes
that he finds "rigorous textual analysis" to be "essential" to statutory interpretation).
203. See Abraham, supra note 202, at 5; Graglia, supra note 135, at 107 (noting that a central
claim of judicial conservatives is that "by engaging in statutory construction that ignores the plain
meaning of the statutes, the courts substitute their own view of what the law should be for what the
legislature has enacted"). This orientation is also revealed by President Reagan's oft-repeated statement
that "the proper role of the courts is to interpret the law, not make it." Stephen Wermiel & Gerald F.
Seib, US. Judge Ginsburg Nominated by Reagan for Supreme Court Post, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1987,
at A22.
204. See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN
TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988).
205. Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit is a prominent exception. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431 (1989)
(advocating a "pragmatist" approach to statutory interpretation).
206. Pilon, supra note 135, at A10 (quoting Terrence Moran, In His Own Image; Bush
Judiciary: White, Male, and Cautious, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File).
207. The likely reason that this fact is under-appreciated is that the majority of circuit judges do
not maintain a high profile in academic circles. Of those Reagan and Bush judges who do publish
regularly in law reviews, however, most are identified as textualists. See Easterbrook, supra note 133;
Kozinski, supra note 133. Furthermore, most of the Reagan and Bush appointees to the Supreme Court
have at one time or another been labeled textualists. See, e.g., Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at
751-52 (maintaining that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist are
"hypertextualists"); Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 401 (arguing that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas are adherents of textualism and that Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist frequently
join textualist opinions). Most of these Justices are former Republican-appointed circuit judges. It would
be remarkable if Presidents Reagan and Bush had selected several textualist judges for seats on the
Supreme Court if in fact only a handful of their circuit court appointees could be construed as textualists.
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find ambiguity less frequently than do other judges. No such trend exists,
however, making it difficult to maintain the belief that textualist judges defer
differently under Chevron from judges who are less committed to finding
meaning in text.
The second argument that proponents of the interpretive model could
make is that all circuit court judges will tend to see the same ambiguity in
statutes because they take their marching orders from the Supreme Court. This
view assumes that the approach to Chevron adopted by the Supreme Court
will be dutifully followed by the circuit courts. For example, if the Supreme
Court adopts a textualist interpretation of Chevron, then the circuit courts will
do the same.2"8 Accordingly, the only school of interpretation that matters is
that which is embraced by the Supreme Court, and the uniformity among
different judges' approaches to Chevron shows only that the circuit court
judges are faithfully following the Supreme Court's interpretive lead.
The problem with the second argument is that the circuit court judges
included in this study found statutory meaning using a variety of interpretive
methods. Some judges used legislative history to look for meaning;209 others
did not.210 Some judges approached step one as if it were a search for plain
meaning,"' while others did not.21 2 This range of interpretive techniques could
be explained by the fact that the Chevron case itself fails to specify what
interpretive method to use at step one: The case punts, telling judges simply to
use "traditional tools of statutory construction."2"' In any event, the absence of
a dominant interpretive method makes it difficult to accept the proposition that
the uniformity of results is explained by circuit court judges' blind obedience
to the latest interpretive orders of the Supreme Court. In direct contravention
of the central claim of the interpretive model, judges applied different
interpretive methods but perceived the same overall degree of ambiguity at
Chevron's first step.
208. See Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 6, at 752 ("If the Court persists in its use of
hypertextualism, lower courts will have no choice but to adopt that method of statutory interpretation.").
209. See, e.g., Strickland v. Commissioner, 96 F.3d 542, 547 (lst Cir. 1996) (Selya, J.)
(examining legislative history to see whether Congress had spoken to the precise issue); United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n v. Perry, 92 F.3d 295, 299 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (considering whether legislative
history transformed a statute that was "ambiguous on its face, [into one that was] unambiguous in fact").
210. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J.)
(examining the plain language of the statute at step one); American Legion v. Derwinski, 54 F.3d 789,
795 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Rogers, J.) (examining only the plain language and the structure of the statute at
Chevron's first step).
211. See, e.g., Cabell Huntington Hosp. Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Wilkinson, C.J.) (finding that the "plain meaning" of the statute resolves the Chevron issue at step one);
Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., 71 F.3d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J.) (same) (citing
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 27 (1993)).
212. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 442 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J.) (concluding
that the Chevron analysis was resolved at step one because the administrative action was "clearly
contemplated" by the statute).
213. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 .
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In light of the substantial body of scholarship that accepts the claims of
the interpretive paradigm, it is surprising that its claims are unsupported by the
data. The question arises: Where did proponents of the interpretive model go
wrong?"1 4 I propose that the model errs by understating the degree to which
theories of statutory interpretation are normative, rather than descriptive. I
submit that jurists internalize interpretative norms based on their largely
intuitive understandings of the proper role of the judiciary in a constitutional
democracy, not on their personal answer to the hermeneutic question of how
much meaning can be extracted from text. Roughly speaking, those judges
who follow text more closely tend to profess a belief in a more limited, rule-
following judiciary,215 while those who endorse a more dynamic interpretative
method tend to appreciate judicial rule-making power." 6 Whether a judge
advocates or rejects textualism does not reflect the judge's capacity to find
more or less meaning in text. Instead, it means that the judge believes that the
body politic is better served by judges who try more or less hard to find what
meaning may be there.
The reason that the interpretive model fails in the Chevron context, then,
is that Chevron asks judges an interpretive question in a context that disrupts
the usual relationship between the outcomes served and the political theories
that typically inform judges' interpretive methods. Chevron upsets the usual
214, 1 focus here on the interpretive model's claim that textualist judges will more frequently see
plain meaning at step one and defer less frequently than other judges. This is the claim most often made
by the interpretive model's proponents, and it is also the most intuitively persuasive. As for the belief
that textualist judges will too frequently see ambiguity and defer, one senses that it arises largely from
the fact that super-textualist Justice Scalia was a longtime advocate of executive power. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, supra note 7 (maintaining that Justice Scalia will find ambiguity at step one because he is
committed to agency power); Stock, supra note 7 (same). In addition, Professor Merrill's suggestion that
textualist judges might be less inclined than other judges to apply Chevron is somewhat puzzling. Even
assuming that textualist judges see plain meaning particularly often, why would textualist judges be less
likely to apply Chevron at all? Would they not simply be more likely than other judges to resolve the
analysis at step one, rather than at step two? In that case, Professor Merrill's claim collapses into the
more common prediction (addressed in depth in the main text) that textualist judges will defer less
frequently than other judges.
215. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (asserting that the
central belief underlying textualism is that judges have no authority to act in a legislative capacity);
Abraham, supra note 202, at 5 (asserting that judges must feel bound by intelligible legal principles if
they are to accept a more limited role); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984) (arguing that judicial perception of ambiguity in
statutes gives judges opportunities to enact their policy preferences into law); Easterbrook, supra note
133, at 63-64 (defending textualism on the grounds that it leads to clear rules and confines judges).
216. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR TIlE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982)
(suggesting that judges should have the authority to overrule obsolete statutes); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAw's EMPIRE 313 (1986) (asserting that a judge's view of statutory meaning should "depend on the
[judge's perception of what is the] best answer to political questions"); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (1994) (suggesting that a judge interpreting statutes should
consider not only the text, but also the judge's belief as to which rules will best fulfill the needs and
goals of present day society); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982)
(describing a mode of interpretation in which the judge is a "partner" with the legislature in creating a
new and evolving meaning from text).
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relationship between interpretation and the judicial role in two ways. First,
statutory ambiguity no longer expands judicial power; it constricts it, limiting
the judicial role to deferential review for unreasonableness. Conversely,
finding meaning in the text no longer limits judicial power; it expands it by
granting to the courts plenary review of administrative action. Second,
Chevron transforms a judge's degree of commitment to the text from a means
of allocating power between the legislature and the judiciary (its usual
function) into a means of allocating power between the judiciary and the
executive. Finding meaning in the text no longer enhances the power of the
legislature over the judiciary; instead, it emphasizes the power of the judiciary
over the executive. I propose that these disruptions of the typical association
between interpretative method and the judicial role explains why judges do
not approach Chevron's first step with their usual interpretive associations
intact. Chevron's atypical interpretive context in effect suspends judges'
normative associations between their approaches to text and political theory.
Consider the case of a judge who adopts an expansive view of the judicial
function and believes that the proper judicial role is to ensure that the broad
policy concerns of Congress are carried out in a fair and just way. Because
textualism requires a judge to adhere to text instead of purpose and justice, the
judge would likely eschew textualism and instead find that most texts were
ambiguous enough to allow the judge to fashion a just remedy.217 In the
Chevron context, however, the ambiguity that would normally allow the judge
to fashion a just remedy backfires. A finding of ambiguity instead binds the
judge to accept a wide range of agency action, even if the judge perceives that
action as unjust. Ambiguity ceases to be an engine of judicial authority and
becomes an engine of uncabined executive power.
In the absence of the usual forces pulling and pushing judges toward
different interpretive approaches, judges who typically are influenced by very
different normative interpretive traditions adopt roughly equivalent
understandings of how ambiguous is ambiguous enough at step one.218 This
does not mean that all judges will agree in every case, of course (although
217. Cf FRANK, supra note 3, at 67-68 (discussing how legal indeterminacy expands judicial
capacity to create proper remedies that can solve otherwise intractable problems).
218. Given how often panels of circuit judges hear Chevron questions, it seems natural that most
judges would tend over time to come to a roughly similar understanding of how high a hurdle is posed
by Chevron's first step. The frequency with which judges apply Chevron is remarkable. In the D.C.
Circuit, for example, circuit judges are likely to face several dozen Chevron issues a year. Even limiting
ourselves to those Chevron applications that met the methodology requirements of this study and
appeared in a published opinion, the D.C. Circuit decided 77 Chevron applications in 1995 and 1996.
Ignoring en banc proceedings, which would also increase the number of judge-applications, that
amounts to 115 judge-applications per year. There were I I judges sitting during the time of the study,
which means that D.C. Circuit judges each decide at least 10 or I I Chevron issues per year in the subset
of cases leading to published opinions.
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most cases are unanimous), but it does mean that no one set of judges will be
led to adopt a particularly different vision of Chevron.2"9
Conclusion
Given the pervasive influence of legal realism, it should not be surprising
that the Chevron doctrine has been a highly popular subject of critique among
academic commentators.2"' More than most recent doctrinal innovations,
Chevron evokes a certain formalism. As construed by some, it is a more or
less mechanical rule, designed to draw a sharp line between the sphere of
"law" mandated by Congress and the sphere of "policy" delegated (by legal
fiction) to agencies. 22 ' This is just the kind of legal doctrine that it was the
mission of the realists to deconstruct.
222
The surprising finding of this study is that Chevron withstands the
challenges posed by the contextual, political, and interpretive critiques
reasonably well in the courts of appeals. The political model mounts the most
effective attack: The results of the study show that judges are more likely to
defer to agency interpretations that support judges' personal political
preferences than they are to interpretations that oppose their personal political
preferences. This inroad is modest, however, because there is no evidence that
this likelihood is greater than that fostered under the doctrinal regime that
Chevron replaced. Further, the remainder of the challenges posed by the three
models are generally unsuccessful. Contrary to the claims of the contextual
model, the presence of pre-Chevron traditional factors does not exert a strong
influence on results; their impact is weak, and perhaps nonexistent. Contrary
to the claims of the interpretive model, courts of appeals judges associated
with textualist approaches to statutory interpretation do not apply Chevron or
defer less frequently than others; in fact, judges from very different normative
interpretive traditions appear to apply the doctrine in essentially the same way.
Even the political model fails to describe the doctrine accurately at a structural
level: Its claim that judges use the doctrine to uphold the executive decisions
of "allies" and reject the decisions of"enemies" is unfounded.
219. Cf Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 856 ("Perhaps the most fundamental reality of D.C. Circuit
decisionmaking is that, contrary to popular belief, circuit judges rarely disagree with one another over
the disposition of particular cases.").
220. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Review Essay, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465,
467 (1988) ("We are all legal realists now.").
221. See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 113 ("[P]olicy disputes within the scope of
authority Congress has delegated an agency are to be resolved by agencies rather than by courts. Courts
and agencies are instructed by Chevron to distinguish policy disputes from disputes with respect to
issues of law by determining whether Congress resolved the dispute.").
222. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, Tin: TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 170
(1992) ("[A]bove all, Realism is a continuation of the Progressive attack on the attempt of late-
nineteenth-century Classical Legal Thought to create a sharp distinction between law and politics and to
portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical.").
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 15:1, 1998
Although the three models have attempted to reveal the Chevron
doctrine's true dynamics, this study suggests a reality somewhat out of step
with their critical preconceptions. Oddly, the best guide for predicting judicial
outcomes under Chevron is probably the test itself.
